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ILLINOIS PUBLIC PENSIONS: WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
By Eric M. Madiar 
Eric M. Madiar is a Springfield, Illinois-based attorney with over 15 years of experience in the 
legislative, litigation, and regulatory arenas of Illinois government where he established a solid 
reputation with key decision-makers as a problem solver. Prior to entering private practice and 
launching Madiar Government Relations, LLC in December 2014, he served as the Chief Legal Counsel 
to Illinois Senate President John J. Cullerton and acted as Senate Parliamentarian from 2009 to 2014. 
Mr. Madiar served as the Senate President’s point-person on public pension reform legislation while he 
was Chief Legal Counsel, and was retained to continue to provide legal services and advice on public 
pension reform matters. He thanks Professor Martin Malin for inviting him to write this Article, which 
is based on an earlier presentation at the Illinois Public Sector Labor Relations Law Conference held at 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law on December 4, 2015.  The Article represents the views of its author.  © 
2016, Eric M. Madiar, all rights reserved. 
 I. OVERVIEW 
Mark Twain once said, “It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble.  It’s 
what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”  For quite some time, the “ain’t so” in 
Illinois has been its enormously underfunded pension system and its obligation to 
pay pension benefits when they become due.[1] Indeed, as a 2009 legislative report 
explained, underfunding of the pension system occurred because the State’s fiscal 
system failed to generate sufficient revenue to both maintain public services, such 
as education, healthcare, and public safety, as well as cover the State’s actuarially 
required pension contributions. [2] As a result, the pension system was used for 
decades as a proverbial credit card to fund public services and stave off the need 
for tax increases or service cuts.[3] 
To tackle its mounting unfunded pension liabilities, the General Assembly passed 
legislation in 2010 that cut the pension benefits provided to future public 
employees and officials entering service after January 1, 2011.  The legislature also 
enacted a temporary income tax increase in 2011 to help retire unpaid bills and 
make timely pension contributions.  And in 2013, the legislature passed two 
pension reform bills that unilaterally cut the pension benefits of retirees and 
current employees.  The first bill applied to participants in four of the State’s five 
pension systems, while the second bill applied to participants in two of the City of 
Chicago’s four pension systems. 
While passing these bills was heralded as a bipartisan political success, it was 
short-lived.  In the last twelve months, the Illinois Supreme Court issued two 
unanimous decisions invalidating both bills as violative of the Pension Clause of 
the Illinois Constitution.  In both decisions, as explained below, the court held that 
the Clause bars the legislature from unilaterally reducing the pension benefits of 
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current public employees and retirees.  Given this outcome and the State’s wider 
fiscal challenges, this Article assesses the legal options the Illinois General 
Assembly may pursue to mitigate the fiscal impact of funding its public pension 
obligations. 
This Article is organized as follows: Part II begins with a primer on the Pension 
Clause of the Illinois Constitution (Article XIII, Section 5).  Part III reviews the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s May 2015 decision, which found that the 2013 Pension 
Reform bill—Public Act 98-0599—violated the Clause.[4] Part IV reviews the 
court’s March 2016 decision, which similarly found that Chicago’s 2013 Pension 
Reform Bill—Public Act 98-0641—violated the Clause.  Part V assesses the options 
that the General Assembly may pursue to mitigate its financial burden of funding 
the pension system based on the Clause’s background and the two recent court 
decisions.  The Article concludes that the use of ordinary contract principles—as 
suggested by this author five years ago—provides a means to reduce pension 
benefits of current employees and thereby mitigate this financial burden.[5] The 
proposal offered by Senate President John J. Cullerton, in particular, provides one 
viable means of mitigation, as does forging an agreement with public sector labor 
unions through the collective bargaining process.  Municipal bankruptcy and 
amending the Pension Clause, however, are not plausible options. 
  II. A BRIEF RECAP OF THE SCOPE OF THE ILLINOIS 
CONSTITUTION’S PENSION CLAUSE 
The Pension Clause of the Illinois Constitution has long been understood to 
present a serious legal obstacle to any efforts by the General Assembly 
to unilaterally reduce the pension benefits of current employees and retirees.[6] 
The Clause, after all, plainly provides that: “Membership in any pension or 
retirement system of the State, unit of local government or school district, or any 
agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, 
the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”[7] 
Indeed, the Clause safeguards from unilateral reduction not only the benefit rights 
contained in the Illinois Pension Code when a person joins a pension system,[8] 
but also those benefits found, at that time, in other state statutes that are “limited 
to, conditioned on, and flow directly from membership in one of the State’s various 
public pension systems,” including subsidized healthcare premiums.[9] The 
Clause’s protection also extends to benefit increases added during an employee’s 
term of service,[10] and most likely to existing employee contribution rates.[11] 
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The “benefits” receiving protection reflects a plain language analysis of the Clause 
and tracks the dictionary definition of the term “benefits.”[12] Dictionaries define 
the term “benefits” as meaning not only the specific annuity payments a public 
employee is eligible to receive, but also other entitlements of membership that 
advantage the employee.[13] This definition mirrors how New York courts define 
the same term under its nearly verbatim constitutional provision, which served as 
the model for our Pension Clause.[14] New York Court decisions state that the term 
refers to “pecuniary matters” and prohibits “any action which would impair or 
diminish the member’s rights to payment of pensions, annuities, and related 
monetary advantages.”[15] 
The Clause, however, does not require a pension system be funded at a particular 
funding percentage or according to a specific funding schedule.[16] Rather, it 
guarantees that pensions will be paid to participants when those payments become 
due.[17] In addition, the Clause grants pension recipients a cause of action to 
compel the payment of pensions if the pension system is on the verge of default or 
in default.[18] 
Finally, while the Clause bars the General Assembly from unilaterally reducing 
pension benefit rights, these rights are “contractual” in nature.[19] As a result, 
pension benefits can be reduced through usual contract modification principles of 
offer, acceptance, and consideration.[20] 
Pension benefits rights are also “governed by the actual terms” of the statute or 
legislative enactment establishing the pension plan.[21] To that end, these rights 
are subject to any contingencies, consistent with public policy, found in the 
pension plan at the time of the participant’s membership.[22] Indeed, the 
convention delegates both sponsoring and opposing the Clause agreed that 
benefits could be later reduced pursuant to a contingency built into the pension 
plan at the time of the participant’s membership.[23] As the Illinois Supreme 
Court observed, if “[m]embership in the System was sought with knowledge of [a] 
condition [built into a pension plan to lower benefits] it clearly cannot be said to 
impair or diminish the benefits within the meaning of the [Clause].”[24] 
In sum, while the Pension Clause protects pension benefits of current employees 
(and retirees) from adverse unilateral changes and that protection begins once a 
person attains membership in the pension plan, pension benefits rights are 
deemed contractual in nature.  Accordingly, pension benefit rights are subject to 
change through usual contract principles as well as any contingencies contained in 
the pension plan at the time of membership based on the Clause’s drafting history 
and relevant court decisions construing the Clause. 
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III.  THE PENSION REFORM DECISION 
As detailed below, the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent Pension Reform decision 
considered whether the General Assembly possessed the power to unilaterally cut 
pension benefits protected by the Pension Clause pursuant to the State’s so-called 
“reserved” or “police” powers.  Specifically, the court addressed whether the 2013 
Pension Reform Bill (Public Act 98-0599) could be sustained under that defense, 
which is allowed under court decisions interpreting the Illinois and U.S. 
Constitutions’ Contract Clauses.  Well before the Act became law in December 
2013, however, this author determined that the Clause posed an absolute legal 
barrier to any unilateral efforts by the General Assembly to reduce the pension 
benefits of current employees and retirees.[25] 
In May 2015, the court confirmed this conclusion, and unanimously found that the 
Clause is not subject to a “police powers” defense.  The court explained that the 
Clause provides absolute protection to pension benefit rights based on its plain 
language, drafting history, constitutional convention debates, and prior decisions 
interpreting the Clause.[26] Accordingly, the Court concluded that Public Act 98-
0599 could not be sustained under a “police powers” defense.  The Court also 
concluded that even if the Clause were subject to a “police powers” exception, the 
Act did not qualify as a permissible invocation of that exception based on the 
State’s sordid history in failing to properly fund the pension system.[27] 
A.  The Act’s Provisions 
The Pension Reform case involved Public Act 98-0599’s reduction of the pension 
benefits of retirees and current Tier 1 employees participating in the Teachers 
Retirement System (TRS), State Universities Retirement System (SURS), State 
Employees’ Retirement System (SERS), and General Assembly Retirement System 
(GARS).[28] As detailed elsewhere, the Act was the product of three years of 
aggressive lobbying efforts by Illinois’ business community and broke a political 
stalemate over competing bills and views on how to address the State’s 
underfunded pension systems.[29] 
Among other things, the Act unilaterally reduced the pension benefits of Tier 1 
employees and retirees in these systems in five different ways.[30] First, the Act 
delayed, by up to five years, when participants under the age of 46 were eligible to 
receive their retirement annuities.[31] Second, it imposed a cap on the maximum 
salary that would be deemed pensionable income when calculating a participant’s 
retirement annuity.[32] Third, it replaced the 3 percent compounded annual 
increase in a participant’s retirement annuity with a formula that capped increases 
at a lower rate based on the participant’s years of service.[33] Fourth, it eliminated 
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at least one and up to five of the annual annuity increases depending on the 
participant’s age at the time the Act took effect.[34] Finally, with respect to the TRS 
and SURS systems, the Act adversely changed how the basic annuity amount is 
calculated for participants in these systems under the “money purchase” 
formula.[35] 
Aside from benefit cuts, the Act reduced by 1 percent of salary the amount current 
employees contributed to the pension system as a trade-off for replacing the 3 
percent compounded annual increase with lower increases.[36] The Act also made 
other changes, such as: (1) restricting collective bargaining rights; (2) allowing 
limited participation in a new defined contribution plan; (3) barring non-
governmental employees from participating in the pension system; and (4) 
prohibiting new hires from using accumulated sick or vacation time to boost their 
pension benefits.[37] 
Finally, the Act replaced the funding schedule enacted in 1995 to achieve 90 
percent funding by fiscal year 2045 with one to achieve 100% funding by fiscal year 
2043.[38] The new schedule also earmarked certain additional amounts for 
payment into these pension systems.[39] The new funding schedule further 
included a so-called statutory “funding guarantee” whereby if the State 
Comptroller failed to make the State pension contributions required by law to a 
relevant State pension system, then the governing board for that pension system 
could file a mandamus action before the Illinois Supreme Court to order payment 
of the required contribution amount.[40] Since the “funding 
guarantee,” mandamus action, and additional pension contributions were merely 
statutory provisions, the General Assembly retained the authority to alter or repeal 
these provisions in the future.[41] 
B.  Procedural History 
Shortly after the Act became law, participants in TRS, SURS, SERS, and GARS filed 
five consolidated lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the legislation and 
moved to enjoin it.[42] Collectively, the lawsuits claimed that the Act’s benefit cuts 
violated various provisions of the Illinois Constitution, including the Pension 
Clause.[43] The circuit court entered a preliminary injunction staying the Act’s 
implementation pending a decision on the merits one month before the Act took 
effect.[44] 
The Illinois Attorney General defended the Act as a justified use the legislature’s 
“police powers.”[45] Specifically, the Attorney General argued that plaintiffs’ 
claims should be rejected as a matter of law: (1) because the legislature possesses 
the inherent power to override and modify obligations imposed on it by the Illinois 
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Constitution when it is reasonable and necessary to advance an important public 
purpose; (2) because of the dramatic squeeze on the State’s finances caused by the 
Great Recession, the strain on the State revenues which would result from having 
to meet current pension obligations, the poor condition of the State’s economy, 
and the continued deterioration of the State’s credit rating despite taking earlier 
action to reduce public spending, raise taxes, defer State vendor payments, and 
enact a second tier of pension benefits for new hires; and (3) because the benefit 
reductions found in the Act were fair and reasonable under these 
circumstances.[46] 
Plaintiffs’ moved to strike the State’s “police powers” affirmative defense and 
separately moved for summary judgment that the Act was void under the Pension 
Clause because that provision was not subject to a “police powers” exception based 
on its plain language, drafting history, and relevant court decisions.[47] The 
Attorney General countered with her own cross motion for summary judgment 
that the “police powers” exception was a valid defense that defeated all of plaintiffs’ 
claims.[48] 
After conducting an argument on the parties’ motions, the circuit court issued its 
decision in late November 2014 granting plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion 
that the Act violated the Clause and entered a permanent injunction against 
enforcement of the Act.[49] The decision also denied the Attorney General’s 
motion.[50] 
The circuit court found that the Act, on its face, would diminish plaintiffs’ protected 
pension benefits in the five ways described above.  The court further found that 
neither the Clause’s plain language, nor court decisions interpreting the Clause 
supported the conclusion that the provision is subject to a “police powers or 
reserved powers” exception.[51] If anything, the circuit court explained, Illinois 
courts have rejected that argument.[52] Finally, the circuit court concluded that 
because the Act was an integrated legislative package it was inseverable and 
therefore unnecessary to consider plaintiffs’ remaining claims.[53] 
The Illinois Attorney General appealed the circuit court decision to the Illinois 
Supreme Court and requested an expedited briefing and argument.[54] The court 
granted that request.  While the parties submitted their respective appellate briefs 
in due course, the court rejected the proposed amici curiae briefs filed by pension 
reform advocates in support of the Act’s constitutionality.[55] These briefs, as with 
the State’s, rehashed the same “police powers” argument the Commercial Club of 
Chicago had advanced back in 2011, which this author thoroughly countered in 
2014.[56] 
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C.  The Illinois Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding 
After providing a basic outline of the defined pension benefits State employees may 
receive, detailing Illinois’ history of failing to properly fund its pension systems, 
and reviewing the Act’s legislative history as well as the case’s procedural history, 
the court stated there were three issues set for review: (1) does the Act’s reduction 
of retirement annuities for TRS, SURS, SERS, and GARS members violate the 
Pension Clause; (2) if so, then can those reductions be upheld under the State’s 
police power; and (3) if not, then are the invalid provisions of the Act 
severable?[57] As detailed below, the court answered “Yes” to the first question, 
and “No” to the second and third questions. 
 Public Act 98-0599 violates the Pension Clause 
On the first issue, the court explained that it was “easily resolved” that the Act’s 
benefit reductions violated the Clause.[58] The court stated that its 
recent Kanerva decision made clear that the Clause’s plain language means “what 
it says” and “if something qualifies as a benefit of the enforceable contractual 
relationship resulting from membership . . . [then] it cannot be diminished or 
impaired.”[59]  The court further stated that Kanerva’s interpretation of the 
Clause “was not a break from prior law” but rather “a reaffirmation” of what was 
articulated in previous decisions of the court and appellate court.[60] 
Under these decisions, the court explained, the Clause provides members of the 
pension system with “a legally enforceable right to receive the benefits they have 
been promised.”[61] The court further explained that the Clause’s protection of 
benefits begins “once an individual first embarks upon employment in a position 
covered by a public retirement system, not when the employee ultimately 
retires.”[62] In addition, the court noted that the Clause’s protection extends to 
benefit increases added during an employee’s term of services so long as he or she 
“complies with any qualifications imposed when the benefits were first 
offered[.]”[63] “Accordingly, once an individual begins work and becomes a 
member of a public retirement system, any subsequent changes to the Pension 
Code that would diminish the benefits conferred by membership in the retirement 
system cannot be applied to that individual.”[64] 
Based on these principles, the court found that the plaintiffs’ retirement annuities 
were protected benefits, including the 3 percent annual compounded increases, 
and that the Act would diminish these benefits by directly reducing their value in 
at least five different ways.[65] The court further found that because the provisions 
of the Act at issue could not be squared with the Clause’s plain language, “the 
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General Assembly overstepped the scope of its legislative power” and the Court was 
“obligated to declare those provisions invalid.”[66] 
Finally, the court observed that its conclusion was supported by a 2014 Arizona 
Supreme Court decision.[67] The Arizona decision involved a provision in the 
Arizona Constitution virtually identical to the Pension Clause and a challenge to 
legislation that reduced the payments retirees would receive under the statutory 
formula providing benefit increases.[68] The Arizona court found that its 
constitution’s pension clause protected not only the base pension amount, but also 
benefit increases because they were both derived from the same statutory 
formula.[69] 
 The Pension Clause is not subject to a “police 
powers” exception 
On the second issue, the court made two holdings with respect to the State’s “police 
powers” argument.  First, the court acknowledged that while contract rights were 
subject to a so-called “police powers” under decisions interpreting the Contract 
Clause of the Illinois and U.S. Constitutions, the Act was not a valid invocation of 
that exception.  Second, the court held that based on the Pension Clause’s plain 
language, drafting history, constitutional convention debates, and relevant court 
decisions interpreting it, the Clause is not subject to a “police powers” 
exception.  As a result, the Pension Clause provides absolute protection to pension 
benefit rights.  Each of these holdings is detailed below. 
At the outset, the court first rejected the proposition that an unambiguous 
provision of the Illinois Constitution, like the Pension Clause, yields to the State’s 
fiscal necessity or a financial emergency.[70] The court stated that each time the 
General Assembly had passed legislation “to reduce or eliminate expenditures 
protected by the Illinois Constitution,” it had “clearly and consistently found [these 
attempts] to be improper.”[71] 
The court illustrated this point by recounting the facts and holdings of its decisions 
in People ex rel. Lyle v. City of Chicago in 1935 and Jorgensen v. Blagojevich in 
2004.[72] In both its Lyle and Jorgensen decisions, the court noted that it had 
compelled the payment of judicial salaries despite claims of fiscal necessity because 
the Illinois Constitution unambiguously barred mid-term salary reductions.[73] 
Both decisions, according to the court, made clear that exigent circumstances alone 
do not create exceptions to unambiguous constitutional provisions.[74] Rather, 
“any departure from the law is impermissible unless justification for that departure 
is found within the law itself.”[75] These decisions, the court explained, instructed 
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that “[n]o principle of law permits us to suspend constitutional requirements for 
economic reasons no matter how compelling the reasons may seem.”[76] 
Next, the court rejected the proposition that the Act was a permissible exercise of 
the State’s “police powers” under relevant Contract Clause decisions.[77] As a 
preliminary matter, the court noted that past Illinois court decisions had found 
that legislation reducing pension benefits was not defensible under such a 
theory.[78] 
The court also found that, for several reasons, the Act could not clear the threshold 
established under contemporary Contract Clause jurisprudence as a valid exercise 
of the General Assembly’s so-called “police powers.”  First, the Act was not a 
response to an unknown or unforeseeable problem, but rather a response to “a 
crisis for which the General Assembly is largely responsible.”[79] Indeed, the court 
observed that the State was well aware of the havoc market forces could have on 
the fiscal health of the public pension system and the repercussions of decades of 
pension underfunding. 
It was also aware of the long-term costs associated with the pension benefits at 
issue and how the benefits were designed to operate.[80] In addition, the State was 
well aware that these benefits were constitutionally-protected by the Pension 
Clause, that the Clause required the payment of these “promised benefits,” and that 
“the responsibility for providing the State’s share of necessary funding fell squarely 
on the legislature’s shoulders.”[81] 
Second, the court found that the Act was not the least restrictive means to address 
the problem because less drastic alternatives were available, especially since the 
legislature had allowed the temporary income tax increase to sunset.[82] If 
anything, the court observed, based on its legislative history, the Act “was an 
expedient to break a political stalemate.”[83] 
Finally, the court equated the Act to a taking of private property, and observed that 
the U.S. Constitution’s Takings Clause “bar[s] the Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens, which in fairness and justice, should be borne 
by the public as a whole.”[84] The court noted how the General Assembly made no 
effort to distribute the burdens of pension funding evenly among Illinoisans let 
alone the State’s contract partners.[85] As a result, the court found that “the State 
could prove no set of circumstances that would satisfy the contract clause.”[86] 
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  The Pension Clause provides absolute 
protection to covered benefits 
In addition to finding the Act failed under a “police powers” analysis, the court 
concluded that the Pension Clause was not even subject to a “police powers” 
exception.[87] The court based this conclusion principally on the Clause’s plain 
language and drafting history at the constitutional convention.[88] The court 
observed how the Clause, unlike other constitutional guarantees in the 1970 
constitution, was not made expressly subject to the State’s “police powers.”[89] 
The absence of such a reservation, the court continued, “was not inadvertent.”[90] 
Indeed, the court detailed how an attempt was made during the convention to 
protect pension benefits by simply adding language to the Illinois Constitution’s 
Contract Clause.[91] That attempt was rejected “in favor of the separate, more 
specific provisions” found in the Pension Clause.[92] Those provisions, the court 
instructed, made clear that pension benefits could not be impaired or 
diminished.[93] Use of the term “diminished” was legally significant, the court 
noted, because Article VI, section 14 of the Illinois Constitution uses the same term 
to protect judicial salaries, and that term had long been interpreted to bar mid-
term salary reductions “notwithstanding the state’s claims of economic 
hardship.”[94] 
The court also recounted the two failed attempts by the Illinois Public Employees 
Pension Laws Commission, an agency of the legislature, to have the Clause’s 
sponsors amend the provision during the convention so that pension benefits were 
subject to unilateral legislative modification.[95] Given the Clause’s plain language 
and drafting history, the court concluded, there was “no possible basis for 
interpreting the [Clause] to mean that its protections can be overridden if the 
General Assembly deems it appropriate”.[96] To interpret the Clause in that 
fashion, the Court determined, would render it “a nullity” and “allow the legislature 
to do the very thing the [Clause] was designed to prevent it from doing.”[97] 
The court next addressed the State’s claim that interpreting the Clause as 
affording absolute protection to pension benefits was tantamount to a surrender 
of sovereign authority, which it may not do.[98] The court rejected the State’s 
claim because the Clause represents “a restriction the people of Illinois had every 
right to impose.”[99] 
The court explained that unlike Great Britain, where sovereignty is vested in 
Parliament, “sovereignty or transcendent power of government resides in or with 
the people.”[100] “The people of Illinois,” in turn, “give voice to their sovereign 
authority through the Illinois Constitution.”[101] And, “[w]here rights have been 
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conferred and limits on governmental action have been defined by the people 
through the constitution, the legislature cannot enact legislation in contravention 
of those rights and restrictions.”[102] After all, “[i]n contrast to a constitutional 
mandate, a legislative act is but the will of the legislature, in a derivative and 
subordinate capacity.  The constitution is their commission, and they must act 
within the pale of their authority, and all their acts, contrary or in violation of the 
constitutional charter, are void.”[103] 
Based on these principles, the court stated that the State’s police powers yielded to 
the Illinois Constitution, including the Pension Clause.[104] “Through this 
provision, the people of Illinois yielded none of their sovereign authority.[105] 
They simply withheld an important part of it from the legislature because they 
believed, based on historical experience, that when it came to retirement benefits 
for public employees, the legislature could not be trusted with more.”[106] 
Indeed, the court reiterated that the Clause was adopted because the delegates 
“were mindful” that the legislature had treated pension funding as a “political 
football,” and used State pension contributions as a revenue source “to help 
balance budgets.”  Those actions, in turn, jeopardized the financial resources 
ultimately needed to pay benefits.  As a result, the delegates added the Clause to 
protect pension benefits “irrespective of the financial condition of a municipality 
or even the state government.”[107] 
The delegates’ distrust of the legislature, the court explained, had unfortunately 
“proven to be well founded.”[108] The court observed that despite the Clause’s 
protections, the “General Assembly has repeatedly attempted to find ways to 
circumvent its clear and unambiguous prohibition against the diminishment or 
impairment of the benefits of membership in a public retirement system.”[109] 
The Act, the court remarked, was simply “the latest assault in this ongoing political 
battle against public pension rights.”[110] Accordingly, because “the General 
Assembly may not legislate on a subject withdrawn from its authority by the 
constitution,” it could not “rely on police powers to overcome this limitation” for 
there is simply “no police power to disregard the express provisions of the 
constitution.”[111] Therefore, the circuit court was “entirely correct when it 
declared [the Act] void and unenforceable.” 
The court concluded its opinion by finding that the Act’s invalid provisions were 
inseverable, and by reaffirming the rule of law.  The court stated emphatically: 
The financial challenges facing state and local governments in Illinois are well 
known and significant.  In ruling as we have today, we do not mean to minimize 
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the gravity of the State’s problems or the magnitude of the difficulty facing our 
elected representatives.  It is our obligation, however, just as it is theirs, to ensure 
that the law is followed.  That is true at all times.  It is especially important in times 
of crisis when, as this case demonstrates, even clear principles and long-standing 
precedent are threatened.  Crisis is not an excuse to abandon the rule of law.  It is 
a summons to defend it.  How we respond is the measure of our commitment to 
the principles of justice we are sworn to uphold.[112] 
D.   The Take Home Message of the Pension Reform Decision 
In its Pension Reform decision, the court confirmed the import of prior decisions 
and scholarship that the Pension Clause is not subject to a “police powers” 
defense.  The court explained that the Clause provides absolute protection to 
pension benefit rights based on its plain language, drafting history, constitutional 
convention debates, and prior decisions interpreting the Clause.  The court also 
found that even if the Clause were subject to a “police powers” defense, the 
legislation at issue did not qualify as a valid invocation of that defense based on the 
State’s history in failing to properly fund the pension system. 
The court indicated, however, in footnote 12 and its discussion of the 2014 Arizona 
Supreme Court decision that benefit increases extended to persons who were 
already retired or who offered no additional service or consideration after the 
increase became law were not protected by the Clause.[113] Finally, the court 
reaffirmed the broader point that the Pension Clause, as with other state 
constitutional restrictions, represents a sovereign limitation the people of Illinois 
imposed on the General Assembly, and the legislature has no legal authority to 
circumvent that restriction. 
IV.  The Chicago Pension Reform Decision 
A.   Background 
Shortly after the trial court found the 2013 Pension Reform Bill unconstitutional 
in November 2014, two lawsuits were filed by participants of the Chicago 
Municipal Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund (“Municipal Fund”) and 
Laborers’ Annuity and Benefit Fund (“Laborers Fund”) challenging the 
constitutionality of the Chicago Pension Reform Bill.[114] The legislation was 
introduced as Senate Bill 1922 as a pension reform proposal initiated by the City 
of Chicago and signed into law as Public Act 98-0614 on June 9, 2014.[115] The 
legislation was the product of negotiations between the City of Chicago and leaders 
of 28 of the 31 labor unions representing employees participating in the Municipal 
and Laborers Funds.[116] The bill took effect on January 1, 2015. 
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Much like the public act found unconstitutional in the Supreme Court’s Pension 
Reform decision, Public Act 98-0614 also unilaterally reduced the pension benefits 
of retirees and Tier 1 employees participating in the two Chicago pension 
funds.  Specifically, the Act diminished pension benefits in at least three ways: (1) 
it reduced the rate of the members’ annual, automatic annuity increases from 3 
percent compounded to no more than 3 percent simple; (2) it eliminated those 
annuity increases altogether in certain years; and (3) it increased the required 
contributions of current employees from 8½ percent to 11 percent of salary 
depending on the funding ratio of the respective pension fund.[117] 
Public Act 98-0614 also included provisions regarding the City of Chicago’s 
obligation to contribute to the Municipal and Laborers Funds.  The Act required 
the City, after a five-year phase in period, to begin making contributions on an 
actuarial basis to achieve 90 percent funding for the two funds by 2055.[118] The 
new statutory funding obligation was a departure from prior law, which had no 
actuarial basis and simply required the City to make pension contributions 
according to a multiple of the amount contributed by employees. 
Along with the new funding schedule, the Act set forth two statutory enforcement 
mechanisms should the City fail to make its required pension contributions. First, 
if the City did not make a required contribution within the time specified by statute, 
then the governing board of the affected pension fund could petition the State 
Comptroller to intercept and redirect the amount due from moneys otherwise 
appropriated by the legislature to the City of Chicago. Second, if the City did not 
make a required contribution, then the governing board of the affected fund could 
bring a mandamus action to compel the City to make the required 
contribution.[119] 
The statutory right of action, however, was qualified in two ways.  The governing 
board had the discretion on whether or not to file the action.  Also, the court 
hearing the action had the authority to establish a reasonable payment schedule in 
order to avoid “imperiling the public health, safety or welfare.”[120] 
B.   Procedural History 
After the filing of the two lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of Public Act 
98-0614 under the Pension Clause, the City of Chicago and State of Illinois 
intervened in both cases to defend the Act.  In January 2015, the plaintiffs moved 
for a preliminary injunction against the Act and the trial court received evidence 
and testimony from both parties.  The City presented evidence that Public Act 98-
0614 was a proper exercise of the legislature’s so-called “police powers.”  Before 
the evidentiary hearings concluded, however, the trial court stayed the proceedings 
16  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT WINTER/SPRING  2016 
 
pending the outcome of the Pension Reform case before the Illinois Supreme 
Court. 
After the Illinois Supreme Court issued its Pension Reform decision in May 2015, 
trial court proceedings resumed on an expedited schedule to decide the 
constitutionality of the Chicago Pension Reform Bill.  Given the Pension 
Reform decision, the City of Chicago advised the trial court that it would no longer 
pursue a “police powers” defense.[121] Instead, the City offered two other 
arguments to uphold the Act, which were adopted by the Illinois Attorney General 
and the two pension fund boards. 
First, the City claimed that the Act provided participants with a “net benefit” that 
did not diminish pension benefits when the Act was viewed as a whole.  To support 
this proposition, the City pointed to Section 22-403 of the Pension Code.  Section 
22-403 states that the obligation to pay pension benefits is an obligation of the 
relevant pension fund itself, and not the “legal obligation or debt” of the 
government entity that employs (or employed) fund participants.[122] 
Based on this statutory provision, the City asserted that its only obligation was to 
contribute to the two pension funds the amounts required by the Pension Code—
nothing more and nothing less.  And since the General Assembly had not required 
the City to contribute to these systems on an actuarially-sound basis, pension 
benefits need only be paid so long as the pension fund itself was solvent.  The City, 
therefore, had no obligation to step in and continue paying benefits if a pension 
fund became insolvent.  Under this logic, the City argued, the Act actually provided 
a “net benefit” to the plaintiffs because the Act now committed the City to fund 
these systems on an actuarial basis with correlating enforcement provisions.  In 
short, in the City’s view, the Act ensured that participants would continue to be 
paid benefits—albeit at a reduced level. 
Second, the City argued that Public Act 98-0614 was the product of a “bargained-
for exchange” between the City and the employees and retirees participating in the 
two pension funds supported by legal consideration.  The City stated that the 
leaders of 28 of the 31 labor unions representing employees participating in both 
pension funds negotiated with the City to reduce employee and retiree pension 
benefits in exchange for the City assuming new funding obligations to prevent the 
funds’ inevitable insolvency. 
In July 2015, the trial court conducted an oral argument and issued its decision 
later that month finding the Act violated of the Pension Clause.  On the City’s “net 
benefit” argument, the trial court found it flawed for several reasons. 
WINTER/SPRING 2016 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  17 
 
The trial court found that, contrary to the City’s position, the Pension Clause itself 
provides an enforceable guarantee that pension benefits are to be paid when they 
became due.[123] The Clause establishes the obligation to pay benefits, the trial 
court explained, by creating a contractual relationship between the employer and 
employee.  Any statute, according to the trial court, that “would purport to subtract 
from this obligation is not consistent with the rights established by the 
[Clause].”[124] 
In addition, the court explained that not all provisions of the Pension Code were 
part of the contractual relationship established by the Clause—only those 
pertaining to benefits were part of it.  Prior Illinois Supreme Court decisions, 
according to the court, made it clear that Pension Code provisions concerning 
pension funding were not part of that relationship.  As a result the trial court 
concluded that the legislature could not trade statutory funding and enforcement 
provisions for benefits cuts, especially when the General Assembly could change or 
repeal those provisions at any time. To allow such a result, the court observed, 
“would render the rights guaranteed by the [Clause] illusory.”[125] 
On the City “bargained for exchange” argument, the trial court held that the 
argument failed under basic contract principles.  The trial court observed that 
while the leaders of 28 of the 31 labor unions representing affected employees 
supported the agreement reached with the City, there was no evidence that the 
unions’ members had actually agreed to and ratified the agreement.  Indeed, there 
was no evidence that the legislation was the result of the collective bargaining 
process.  In addition, there was no evidence demonstrating that the union leaders 
were authorized agents who could bind the other three unions (or their members), 
let alone retirees.  As a result, the trial court concluded that the legislation did not 
constitute a “bargained for exchange,” but rather a unilateral reduction in benefits 
violative of the Pension Clause. 
Based on these conclusions, the trial court entered a permanent injunction against 
the entire Public Act due to its express inseverablity clause, and denied the City’s 
motion to stay the decision pending appeal.  The City and the two municipal 
pension funds appealed the trial court decision, and the Illinois Supreme Court 
held oral argument on the case in November 2015. 
C.   The Illinois Supreme Court’s Analysis and Holding 
On March 24, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court issued its decision in the Chicago 
Pension Reform case.  The court stated that the issue before it was whether the 
legislation—Public Act 98-0614—violated the Pension Clause.  In a succinct 
opinion authored by Justice Mary Jane Theis, the court unanimously answered 
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“Yes” and found that the Act unconstitutional.  As detailed below, the court first 
found that the Act could not be squared with its recent Pension Reform decision 
before turning to and rejecting the City’s “net benefit” and “bargained for 
exchanged” defenses. 
1.  Public Act 98-0614 was inconsistent with the Pension Reform decision 
The court began its analysis by briefly recounting the scope of the Pension Clause 
based on its Kanerva and Pension Reform decisions.  Drawing on its review of 
these decisions, the court explained, the Clause creates “an enforceable contractual 
relationship, and the employee has a constitutionally protected right to the benefits 
of that contractual relationship . . . at the time an individual begins employment 
and becomes a member of the public pension system.”[126] 
The Clause’s plain language, in turn, bars “the General Assembly 
from unilaterally reducing or eliminating the pension benefits conferred by 
membership in the system.”[127] The Pension Reform decision, according to the 
court, reaffirmed these principles by holding that the legislature could 
not unilaterally diminish “the value of retirement annuities” for current members, 
including the annual annuity increases they were entitled to receive in 
retirement.[128] 
On its face, the court observed, Public Act 98-0614 had the same impact as the 
legislation found unconstitutional in the Pension Reform decision.[129] The Act 
not only reduced the value of annual annuity increases, but it also eliminated 
increases entirely for certain years.  As a result, the court found that the Act 
contravened the Clause’s “absolute prohibition against diminishment of pension 
benefits, and exceed[ed] the General Assembly’s authority.”[130] 
The fact that the legislature enacted Public Act 98-0614 to address the City’s 
undisputed exigent circumstances, the court explained, was legally irrelevant 
because the same justification was rejected in the Pension Reform decision.[131] 
Quoting its Pension Reform decision, the court reiterated that there was “no 
possible basis for interpreting the provision to mean that its protections can be 
overridden if the General Assembly deems it appropriate.”[132] To do so, the court 
reiterated, “would require that we allow the legislature to do the very thing the 
[Clause] was designed to prevent it from doing.”[133] 
2.  The City’s “net benefit” argument was illusory 
Turning to the City’s “net benefit” argument, the court described it as claiming that 
“the Act’s new promise of financial stability offsets the diminishment of benefits” 
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and thereby confers a benefit on affected participants when the Act is viewed as a 
whole.[134] As detailed below, the court rejected the City’s argument based on 
three reasons. 
First, the court stated that the argument proceeded “from the flawed premise that 
the provisions of the Act that enhance the City’s funding obligation or change the 
method of funding to fully fund the pensions are ‘benefits’ entitled to constitutional 
protection.”[135] This premise, according to the court, “conflict[ed] with settled 
precedent.”[136] 
According to the court, its Pension Reform, Lindberg,[137] McNamee, 
and Sklodowski decisions all instructed that “[l]egislative funding choices . . . 
remain outside the protections of the” Clause and the provision does “not control 
funding.”[138] As a result, “passing a funding statute that aims to provide full 
funding by increasing the multiplier used to determine the City’s contribution, or 
by changing the method of funding to an actuarially based funding requirement to 
ensure the Funds reach 90 percent by 2055 and beyond does not create a ‘benefit’ 
protected by the [Clause].”[139] 
Second, the court found that the Act contained no clear and unmistakable language 
indicating that the General Assembly intended to create “an enforceable 
contractual right to full actuarial funding that would be protected against 
impairment by subsequent legislation.”[140] The court explained that legislation 
does not normally create contractual or vested rights, unless the legislature 
expressed “clear and unequivocal” intent to do so.[141] Nothing in the Act’s 
operative language, the court found, expressed such intent even though the 
General Assembly’s “stated purpose in enacting the legislation [was] to save the 
Funds from insolvency.”[142] Accordingly, the Act’s “statutory funding provisions 
[were] not a ‘benefit’ that can be ‘offset’ against an unconstitutional diminishment 
of pension benefits.”[143] 
Third, “and most importantly,” the court rejected the City’s claim that the Act’s 
funding provisions created a “benefit” “because they replace[d] an illusory set of 
unfunded statutory promises” derived from Section 22-403 of the Pension 
Code.[144] According to the court, adopting the City’s view that Section 22-403 of 
the Code only gave participants “a right to the money available in their respective 
funds upon retirement” “would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the 
[Clause], and would undermine our holding in [the Pension Reform decision], and 
would lead to an absurd and unjust result.”[145] The Court explained that the 
Clause itself “mandates that members of the Funds have ‘a legally enforceable right 
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to receive the benefits they have been promised’—not merely to receive whatever 
happens to remain in the Funds.”[146] 
Indeed, the court remarked, the “whole purpose of establishing the clause was ‘to 
eliminate any uncertainty as to whether state and local governments were 
obligated to pay pension benefits to their employees.’”[147] Furthermore, the 
General Assembly and City had been put on notice since the 1970 Constitution’s 
ratification “that the benefits of membership must be paid in full, and that they 
must be paid without diminishing or impairing them.”[148] As a result, the notion 
that the General Assembly could somehow offer a purported “offsetting benefit” of 
actuarially sound funding and fund solvency was absurd because it was “merely an 
offer to do something” the Clause already mandated when participants joined the 
pension fund.[149] 
The court concluded that to the extent Section 22-403 of the Pension Code 
purported to establish that members of the two City funds only had the right to 
amounts in the Fund itself “by virtue of the legislatively-prescribed funding 
choices, that section cannot overcome the [Clause’s] constitutional 
guarantee.”[150] The court noted how Section 22-403 was enacted prior to the 
1970 Constitution and before the Clause established “a contractual relationship 
between employer and employee” and its corollary legal obligation to pay pension 
benefits to employees.[151] 
The court further noted that to the extent Section 22-403 conflicted with the 
Clause’s mandate, “it did not survive ratification of the Illinois Constitution.”[152] 
The new constitution’s Transition Schedule provision, the court found, invalidated 
any pre-1970 statutes conflicting with provisions of the 1970 Illinois 
Constitution.[153] 
The court concluded its rejection of the City’s “net benefit” argument by finding 
that the Act’s salutary goal of solvency simply could not justify the unconstitutional 
means used to achieve that end.[154] To permit such a result, the court 
admonished, would require it to abdicate its own obligation to invalidate 
unconstitutional laws, and create “an end run around the reserved sovereign 
powers argument” the court rejected in its Pension Reform decision.[155] Simply 
put, the Clause “removed the option of unilaterally diminishing benefits as a 
means of attaining pension stability.”[156] 
The court further admonished that the Clause was intended to foreclose the ability 
of the General Assembly to “create the very emergency conditions used to justify 
its suspension of the rights conferred and protected by the constitution.”[157] In 
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sum, the General Assembly could not unilaterally decide whether pension 
participants were “better off” under the Act because that “determination must be 
made, if at all, according to contract principles by mutual assent of the members, 
not by legislative dictates.”[158] 
3.  The City’s “bargained for exchange” argument failed under basic contract 
principles 
Turning to the City’s final argument, the court rejected the claim that the Act was 
not a product of unilateral action, but rather “codified a bargained for exchange 
made between the City and the unions representing the Funds’ participants.”[159] 
The court observed that while the Act may have been the product of negotiations 
and promoted as an agreement with the City’s labor unions, it was not the result of 
a “bargained for exchange.”[160] 
“To be sure,” the court recognized, “ordinary contract principles allow for the 
modification of pension benefits in a bargained for exchange for 
consideration.”[161] In addition, the court stated that prior decisions made clear 
that the Clause neither “prohibits the legislature from providing ‘additional 
benefits’ and requiring additional employee contributions or other consideration”, 
nor prohibits “an employee from knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to modify 
pension benefits from an employer in exchange for valid consideration from the 
employer.”[162] 
In the collective bargaining context, though, the court noted that under Illinois law 
public employees designate a particular union as their exclusive agent to conduct 
collective bargaining negotiations.[163] And the New York court decisions the City 
relied on to support its “bargained for exchange argument” all involved agreements 
where pension benefit rights were changed through completion of the collective 
bargaining process.[164] 
In this case, however, the court observed, it was “undisputed that the unions were 
not acting as authorized agents within a collective bargaining process.”[165] 
Accordingly, the negotiations the City engaged in with the unions “were no 
different from legislative advocacy on behalf on any interest group supporting 
collective interests to a lawmaking body.”[166] As a result, the court found that the 
plaintiffs had done nothing to “unequivocally assent” to the Act’s benefit changes, 
and that “nothing in the legislative process” that led to the Act “constituted a waiver 
of the Funds members’ constitutional rights under the [Clause.]”[167] 
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D.  The Take Home Message of the Chicago Pension Reform 
Decision 
The court’s recent Chicago Pension Reform decision reaffirmed and clarified 
several points with respect to the protective scope of the Pension Clause.  First, the 
court reiterated that adhering to usual contract principles offers an avenue to 
modify (i.e., reduce) pension benefits protected by the Clause.  Nothing in the 
Clause’s jurisprudence supports a contrary proposition.  Second, as an analogue to 
contract principles, the court indicated that pension benefits of public employees 
belonging to a union may be changed by a labor union through the collective 
bargaining process when acting as the exclusive bargaining agent under the State’s 
public sector labor relations laws. 
Third, the court also reiterated that the General Assembly lacks 
the unilateral power to reduce the value of the pension benefits participants are 
entitled to receive under the plan in place when they joined the system, including 
covered benefit increases.  As the court put it, there was “no possible basis for 
interpreting the [Pension Clause] to mean that its protections can be overridden if 
the General Assembly deems it appropriate.”[168] 
Finally, with respect to pension underfunding, the court made clear that the Clause 
itself guarantees that pension benefits must be paid when they become due and 
that the insolvency of a particular pension fund could not obviate that 
obligation.  The court explained that this obligation derives from the Clause 
through its creation of a contractual relationship between public employees and 
their employer, which absolutely safeguards the benefits of that relationship from 
diminishment or impairment.  The court further explained that the funding 
provisions found in the Illinois Pension Code are not deemed part of the 
contractual relationship that forms the basis of the Clause’s scope of protection.  As 
a result, the notion that the General Assembly could somehow offer a purported 
“offsetting benefit” of fund solvency was absurd because it was “merely an offer to 
do something” already mandated by the Clause when participants joined the 
pension fund. 
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V.   WHERE TO NEXT? 
In light of the Pension Clause’s background and the Illinois Supreme Court’s two 
recent decisions, the obvious question is what can the State legitimately do to 
address its plight?  As detailed below, there are four permissible options.  It is also 
worthwhile to discuss two other proposals that are offered by certain stakeholders, 
but lack plausibility as detailed below. 
 A. Permissible Options 
1.  Senate President John J. Cullerton’s contractual proposal 
a.  The proposal and its legal rationale 
The first option the General Assembly may pursue is the proposal outlined by 
Senate President John J. Cullerton to reduce pension benefits in a constitutional 
manner through contract principles.  The core of this approach was set forth in 
Senate Bill 2404,[169] which passed the Senate 40-16-0 in May 2013 with 
bipartisan and labor union support.[170] Despite that support, Senate Bill 2404 
was never called for a vote in the House of Representatives.  The proposal offers a 
pragmatic constitutional path to mitigate the pension underfunding problem and 
its impact on the State budget. 
The proposal offers Tier 1 employees in the three largest State pension systems—
TRS, SURS, and SERS—a choice of either agreeing to a lower annual annuity 
increase (i.e., “COLA increase”) or rejecting the requested 
change.[171] Specifically, the legislation provides an election process wherein Tier 
1 employees are expressly asked in the legislation to agree to waive their right to 
the current annual 3 percent compounded COLA increase they would otherwise 
receive in retirement, and instead receive the Tier 2 COLA increase. The Tier 2 
COLA increase would annually increase a participant’s retirement annuity amount 
by the lesser of 3 percent simple or half the rate of inflation, and delay the receipt 
of those increases to the earlier of five years after retirement or age 67. 
Tier 1 employees who agree to the lower COLA increase will receive, at a 
minimum, one item of legal consideration for giving up their current compounded 
3 percent COLA.  In the legislation itself, the State expressly and irrevocably 
promises, as an employer, to never offer future salary increases on a non-
pensionable basis.  The waiver of this right creates a new legal detriment on the 
State, as an employer, that benefits employees who accept the offer. 
Tier 1 employees who reject the COLA change will continue to keep their current 
annual 3 percent compounded COLA increases in retirement.  For these 
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employees, however, the State will exercise its legal right as an employer and only 
offer all future salary increases to these employees on a non-
pensionable basis.  Put differently, a Tier 1 employee rejecting the COLA change 
will still be offered salary increases in the future, but only on the express condition 
that the increases, if accepted, will not apply in the calculation of the employee’s 
pension at retirement. This option reflects the status quo because an employee will 
continue to keep their compounded COLA while the State may exercise the legal 
right it currently has, as explained below, to tie conditions to future salary 
increases. 
For example, if a Tier 1 employee rejects the COLA change and currently has an 
actual salary of $50,000, then the employee’s pensionable salary amount will 
remain frozen at $50,000 even though the employee later receives increases on 
a non-pensionable basis that raise his or her actual salary to $75,000 at the time 
of retirement.  The Tier 1 employee in this example, though, would not pay pension 
contributions on salary amounts above $50,000. 
The Senate President’s proposal is based on the premise that pension benefits 
protected by the Pension Clause are “contractual” in nature and subject to 
modification “in accordance with usual contract principles.”[172] As confirmed by 
the Illinois Supreme Court’s Chicago Pension Reform decision, while pension 
benefits cannot be reduced unilaterally, they can be reduced or otherwise 
modified so long as the employee “knowingly and voluntarily” agrees to the 
modification “in exchange for valid consideration from the employer.”[173] 
Illinois courts define the term “consideration” as “some right, interest, profit or 
benefit accruing to one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or 
responsibility given, suffered or undertaken by the other.”[174] Under Illinois law, 
“any act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is 
a sufficient consideration to support a contract.”[175] A promise, however, to do 
what a person is already bound to do by contract or statute does not constitute legal 
consideration.[176] 
On the issue of what may serve as “consideration,” the Illinois Appellate Court has 
indicated that work hours, salary levels, and other terms of employment are 
generally not protected by the Clause even though changes to these terms would 
indirectly affect the pension amount a person would ultimately receive in 
retirement.[177] Indeed, as to salaries, Illinois courts have long held that public 
employees do not have a vested right in the expectation of the continuance of a 
specific rate or method of compensation, even where they are employed prior to 
the amendment of an enacted salary schedule.[178] 
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In addition, the Illinois Appellate Court has noted that New York court decisions 
have found it permissible for a public employer to offer future salary increases on 
the condition that the increases not qualify as pensionable income if accepted by 
the employee.[179] The New York decisions instruct that since a public employer 
has no obligation to offer public employees salary increases—unless otherwise 
required by statute or contract—the employer has the power to offer future salary 
increases either without condition—and thereby count toward the employee’s 
pension—or on a non-pensionable basis.[180] In turn, when employees accept 
future salary increases on an express non-pensionable basis, they cannot later 
claim that these increases are includable for pension purposes because a waiver 
has occurred and the increases are thereby excluded from the pension calculation 
formula.[181] 
Recast in the light of these decisions, the Senate President’s proposal harnesses the 
discretionary power of the State, as an employer, to condition or not condition its 
offering of future salary increases to each Tier 1 employee in order to obtain a 
pension benefit reduction.  The legal consideration the proposal offers to each Tier 
1 employee who agrees to lower COLA increases in retirement is the State’s 
irrevocable promise, as an employer, to never offer him or her future salary 
increases on a non-pensionable basis.  A Tier 1 employee, of course, is free to reject 
this offer.  If he or she does, then the employee would do so with the full knowledge 
that all future salary increases will only be offered to him or her expressly on a non-
pensionable basis—a right the State, as an employer, may exercise. 
According to news reports, the Senate President’s proposal is estimated to save the 
State about $1 billion a year.[182] In sum, the Senate President’s proposal offers a 
basic framework that can be enhanced with other forms of consideration to achieve 
the same objective of savings to the State. 
b.  The arguments against the Senate President’s proposal are unfounded 
Critics claim that the Senate President’s proposal fails to follow contract principles 
on four main grounds and therefore violates the Pension Clause.[183] Ironically, 
some of the critics of this proposal are the same labor unions that supported and 
characterized Senate Bill 2404 from 2013 as “constitutional”[184] even though the 
proposal contains the same pensionable salary choice as Senate Bill 2404.[185] 
None of these grounds are compelling and dispositive as explained below. 
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i. The proposal provides legal consideration 
 
Critics first contend the proposal does not offer Tier 1 employees any legal 
consideration because every time employees receive a salary increase it must count 
for pension purposes and this is something that the Pension Code already 
protects.  This contention is wrong as a matter of law. 
As noted earlier, relevant New York court decisions that Illinois courts rely upon 
hold that increased compensation only constitutes pensionable salary when the 
employer grants it unconditionally.[186] The same argument that critics advance 
today failed in New York long ago.[187] Illinois courts find New York court 
decisions construing that state’s virtually identical pension clause persuasive.[188] 
In addition, the critic’s contention is not supported by the Pension Code’s plain 
language.   The relevant provisions of SERS, SURS, and TRS defining pensionable 
compensation all refer to compensation that has already been earned and does not 
expressly foreclose the public employer’s right to offer future salary increases on 
a non-pensionable basis.[189] If the critics’ contention were true, then a public 
employer could only avoid the actuarial impact of salary increases by giving no 
increases at all. 
To be sure, Illinois and New York court decisions have equally invalidated 
legislation that unilaterally narrowed the statutory definition of pensionable 
salary.[190] None of these decisions, however, involved an express offering of 
future salary increases on a non-pensionable basis.[191] As a result, these 
decisions simply cannot be mined to create a far broader rule of law for factual 
circumstances not even before the court. Any attempt to do so reflects, at best, 
wishful thinking. 
Despite the critics’ protests, the Senate President’s proposal does, indeed, offer 
employees legal consideration.  As discussed previously, the State is irrevocably 
promising, as an employer, to never offer them future salary increases on a non-
pensionable basis.  The waiver of this legal right is a new benefit that employees 
accepting the offer would obtain and do not possess today.  Illinois courts state that 
any “act or promise which is of benefit to one party or disadvantage to the other is 
a sufficient consideration to support a contract.”[192] The Senate President’s 
proposal is a far cry from the circumstances where Illinois courts have found the 
offered consideration grossly inadequate and illusory.[193] 
Moreover, the claim that the offered consideration is “not meaningful” or 
“inadequate” because it is not equivalent to the financial value of what employees 
WINTER/SPRING 2016 ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT  27 
 
are giving up is not compelling.  As the Illinois Supreme Court recently explained, 
“principles of contract law do not require that the value [the parties] exchange be 
equivalent.”[194] Indeed, courts do not generally inquire into the adequacy of the 
consideration for a contract, just that it be present, which is the case with the 
Senate President’s proposal.[195] 
ii. The proposal reflects a “bargained-
for” exchange 
 
Critics next contend that the benefit reduction resulting from the proposal does 
not reflect a “bargained-for exchange” between the State and Tier 1 
employees.  Critics complain that Tier 1 employees have no ability to individually 
bargain for the “consideration” they may deem most valuable to agree to lower 
annual COLA increases in retirement.  Instead, the proposal purportedly presents 
employees with a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer leading only to negative financial 
outcomes. 
The critics’ argument proceeds from a fundamental misapprehension of Illinois 
contract law.  Illinois courts do not invalidate contracts where parties have unequal 
bargaining power—even contracts presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis—and 
consent is secured through hard bargaining and the pressure of financial 
circumstances.[196] Indeed, the “bargained-for exchange” requirement neither 
prohibits “take-it-or-leave-it” offers,[197] nor insists upon the ability to 
individually negotiate the terms of the offer.[198] 
Rather, under general contract principles, a “bargained-for exchange” exists if one 
party’s promise induces the other party’s promise or performance.[199] The Senate 
President’s proposal adheres to the “bargained for” exchange requirement by 
expressly offering the State’s irrevocable promise in exchange for employees 
agreeing to lower annual COLA increases in retirement. 
iii. The proposal has ample case law 
support 
 
Critics further contend that the New York court decisions that support the proposal 
only dealt with the notion that a public employer can offer a “bonus,” not regular 
salary as non-pensionable, and even then only on a one-off basis.  Aside from 
admitting the legal premise that a public employer has the right to offer 
compensation on a non-pensionable basis, the argument blatantly ignores the 
factual and legal context of these decisions. 
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The primary New York case supporting the Senate President’s proposal is Carroll 
v. Grumet.[200] In Carroll, the court held that a plan adopted by New York City 
granting firemen “emergency cost-of-living-increases” designed to foster 
continued employment by increasing take-home pay, without affecting their 
pensions, squared with the New York Constitution’s Pension Clause.[201] The plan 
provided cost of living adjustments of “$420 per annum upon [the] condition that 
such increase should not constitute salary for the purpose of computing his 
pension upon retirement.”[202] 
The plaintiff in the case received and accepted one of the $420 annual increases, 
retired, and later filed suit to have that increase included in his pensionable 
salary.[203] The plaintiff claimed that the exclusion of the increase he received 
violated his pension rights because the relevant pension statute stated that his 
pension would be “not less than one-half his full salary or compensation at the date 
of his retirement from service.”[204] The plaintiff asserted that “full salary or 
compensation” included the $420 annual “bonus.” 
The court tersely responded that “[i]f the increased compensation had 
been unconditionally granted by the City without question it would have 
constituted salary or compensation for pension purposes.”[205] In other words, 
the fact that the increase was called a “cost-of-living increase” or “bonus” was 
legally irrelevant.  What was relevant, the court observed, was that the plaintiff 
voluntarily accepted the so-called “bonus” under the express condition that it “not 
be regarded as salary for pension purposes,” and that the plaintiff was not 
otherwise legally-entitled to receive the increase.[206] Taken together, the court 
concluded that plaintiff’s acceptance of the increase under the stated condition 
constituted a waiver of his pension rights for valid consideration, and was 
consistent with the New York Constitution’s pension provision. 
Simply put, the Carroll decision does not, as critics claim, represent a 
circumstance where the public employer offered a one-time compensation 
increase on a non-pensionable basis to employees.  Rather, the public 
employer categorically made all increases subject to that condition when offered 
each year.  In addition, the fact that the increase was called a “cost-of-living 
increase” or “bonus” was legally irrelevant because the court recognized that, 
absent the condition, the increase would have constituted pensionable “salary or 
compensation” under the governing pension statute. 
Indeed, the Illinois Appellate Court relied on the Carroll decision long ago as an 
example of action public employers could take consistent with our Pension 
Clause.[207] In addition, in Ballentine v. Koch, New York’s highest court 
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construed the Carroll case (and its progeny) as allowing “funds ordinarily included 
in the calculation of pension benefits” to be offered on a non-
pensionable basis.[208] This is the same Ballentine decision the Illinois Supreme 
Court favorably cited in its recent Chicago Pension Reform decision.[209] 
In short, the Senate President’s proposal squares with the New York court 
decisions Illinois courts have relied upon to construe our Pension 
Clause.  Furthermore, the proposal itself is no different from what occurred 
in Carroll: it too categorically offers future compensation increases otherwise 
qualifying as pensionable income on a non-pensionable basis.  Critics of the 
proposal can make no valid or compelling claim to the contrary. 
iv. The proposal is not tantamount to 
duress 
 
Critics finally contend that the proposal is coercive and void as economic 
duress.  This is so, critics claim, because the proposal’s offered choice is coupled 
with the threat that all future increases will only be offered on a non-
pensionable basis if employees reject the offer.  This argument is without merit 
and can be dispatched quickly. 
Under Illinois law, economic duress exists when a person is induced to enter into 
a contract by a “wrongful act” or threat of such an act by another person that, in 
turn, deprives the person entering into the contract of his or her free will.[210] 
“Wrongful acts” are acts that are criminal, tortious, in violation of a contractual 
duty or wrong in a moral sense.[211] Illinois courts have held that a claim of duress 
cannot be predicated on hard bargaining or the financial pressure it places on the 
person having to make the choice.[212] In addition, the fact that the a proposal 
presents a person with choices that all entail negative outcomes when compared to 
his or her existing circumstances does not render the proposal a “wrongful 
act.”[213] 
More importantly, the fact that an offer is structured in a way that includes a threat 
by the person making the offer to take action that the person has a legal right to 
exercise does not constitute economic duress or coercion.[214] Since the Senate 
President’s proposal is premised on the State’s threat to exercise a legal right it 
possesses there is no “wrongful act” to support the critics’ claim of duress. 
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2.  Collective Bargaining 
Aside from the Senate President’s contractual proposal, the Illinois Supreme 
Court’s Chicago Pension Reform decision strongly indicates that pension benefits 
may also be modified by public sector labor unions acting as authorized agents 
within the collective bargaining process for their members under Illinois law.[215] 
The court found that the legislation at issue violated the Pension Clause because 
the labor unions “were not acting as authorized agents within the collective 
bargaining process.”[216] To support this proposition, the court referenced two 
New York court decisions cited by the City of Chicago. 
In these decisions, the New York Court of Appeals held that duly designated labor 
unions could bind their members to the terms of collective bargaining agreements 
that waived the constitutional protections the members enjoyed under the New 
York Constitution’s pension clause.[217] As another New York court succinctly 
explained, the purpose of its pension clause “was merely to insure that pension and 
retirement benefits would not be subject to the whim of the Legislature or the 
caprice of the employer.”[218] The court continued that: 
Whereas unilateral action by the employer or the Legislature may not impair such 
benefits, the parties are not prevented from negotiating a reduction.  The Union is 
free to waive any right of its members to certain benefits in exchange for other 
consideration and the parties are free to negotiate less beneficial terms for new 
employees hired after the agreement expires.  As long as the contractual benefits 
are not unilaterally diminished, there is no constitutional violation.[219] 
In short, New York court decisions indicate that duly authorized unions may 
collectively bargain over and waive the protected pension benefit rights of their 
members in exchange for consideration. 
Whether Illinois courts will reach the same broad conclusion as New York courts 
with respect to Illinois public sector labor unions under our Pension Clause 
remains to be seen.  Mayor Rahm Emanuel of Chicago, however, has expressed 
interest in not waiting long to find out. 
Shortly after the Illinois Supreme Court issued its decision, Mayor Emanuel stated 
that he intends to restart negotiations with the City’s labor unions to forge a 
pension reform agreement through collective bargaining given “the opening” 
provided by the decision.[220] If a new accord with labor unions cannot be 
reached, then Mayor’s office may pursue “work-rule changes, lower break-in pay 
for new employees, another round of health care reforms, and other cost-saving 
concessions and dedicate those savings to pensions.”[221] 
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It is important to note that as this Article went to press the Illinois Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority.[222] In that 
decision, the court further confirmed that ordinary contract principles may be used 
to modify the existing pension benefits of current employees, and that public sector 
labor unions have the authority to modify the existing pension benefits of its active 
members through the collective bargaining process.[223] The Matthews decision 
appears to provide a clear path for the use of the collective bargaining process as a 
contractual means to modify the pension benefits of current public employees who 
belong to unions. 
3 . Buyout Proposals 
Aside from pursuing the above contractual proposals, legislators are also 
considering proposals that would offer to buy out Tier 1 employees of their pension 
benefits by giving employees an immediate lump sum amount at retirement.[224] 
Unlike the buyout plans prevalent in the private sector, though, legislators are 
advancing proposals that offer lump sum payments that are less than the net 
present value of these benefits and thereby reduce State pension contributions. 
House Bill 4427, the best studied of these proposals, sponsored by Representative 
Mark Batinick, offers a one-time payment option equal to 75 percent of the net 
present value of benefits.[225] Employees need not seek a discounted buyout of 
their entire pension, but may seek a partial buyout.  For example, they can choose 
to receive 50 percent of their normal pension payment, and then receive a lump 
sum payment that is equal to 75 percent of the net present value of the remaining 
benefit.[226] Aside from saving the State money by discounting the liability, the 
proposal shifts the investment risk now borne by the State to the employees taking 
the buyout. 
It is difficult to estimate the financial impact of the proposal since the savings are 
directly related to each member’s decision, which is difficult to predict.  Some have 
stated that the rate of participation would mirror the participation rates in private 
sector buyouts, but that is highly unlikely to occur for two reasons. 
First, private sector employees receive buyout proposals equal to 100 percent of 
the net present value of their benefit.[227] Second, private sector buyouts are 
calculated with interest rates between 4 and 5 percent. [228] The proposed buyouts 
in House Bill 4427 are calculated with the pension system’s assumed rate of return, 
which is 7.5 percent for TRS and 7.25 percent for SERS and SURS.[229] The higher 
the interest rate, the lower the buyout payment.  Because of these differences, the 
participation rate in this proposed buyout should be considerably lower than that 
of private pension plans. 
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To that end, actuaries for TRS performed an actuarial analysis assuming ten or 
twenty percent of employees would elect to receive a full buyout at 
retirement.[230] If ten percent of employees participating in TRS made that 
election, then the State will save $3.5 billion in contributions between now and 
2045, [231] and reduce the State’s pension contribution by $79 million the first 
year after it takes effect.[232] If twenty percent make the election, then buyout 
savings would essentially double.[233] And as a rule of thumb, the potential 
savings associated with the proposal as applied to SERS and SURS should be equal 
to TRS.[234] As a result, House Bill 4427 could save the State approximately $7 
billion in pension contributions through 2045,[235] and reduce the State’s next 
annual pension contribution of nearly $7 billion by $160 million after it takes 
effect.[236] 
  Restructuring Pension System Funding 
As noted above, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the Pension Clause 
guarantees that pensions are to be paid when they become due and that the 
obligation to pay benefits exists irrespective of the pension system’s funding 
ratio.[237] With that said, how the State could meet these obligations presents a 
serious political problem because current revenues are insufficient to also pay for 
competing fiscal priorities.  This task has become even more difficult with the 
expiration of the 2011 income tax increase,[238] and a continuing State budget 
stalemate in its eleventh month as of this writing.[239] As a result, aside from 
pursuing different contractual options, the General Assembly may also attempt to 
mitigate the immediate and long-term financial burden of funding the pension 
system by restructuring its current statutory funding schedule. 
To that end, the Center for Tax and Budget Accountability (CTBA) has offered a 
proposal that has garnered some attention. [240] The CTBA proposal would 
replace the current statutory funding schedule for the State’s five pension 
systems.  That schedule seeks to achieve 90 percent funding by FY 2045.  The 
CTBA proposal would re-amortize that scheduled to seek to achieve 80 percent 
funding by FY 2055.[241] 
Unlike the current back-loaded funding schedule that increases State 
contributions each year, the CTBA proposal places the State on a schedule of 
making level-dollar contributions to the pension systems, much like fixed 
mortgage payments.[242] CTBA states that a level dollar payment plan would 
make State pension contributions more predictable and become a declining 
financial obligation over time in real, inflation-adjusted dollars.[243] The 
proposal, however, would require the State to make higher pension contributions 
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than under current law.[244] It is also premised on policymakers restructuring 
how the State raises revenue through higher income taxes and an expanded sales 
tax on services so it can afford the new level dollar funding schedule and other 
spending priorities.[245] 
Beyond the CTBA proposal, there continues to be strong interest in shifting the 
employer’s portion of the “normal cost” of pension benefits paid by the State for 
downstate and suburban school teachers and university and community college 
employees, respectively, to local school districts, universities, community 
colleges.[246] The “normal cost” represents the cost of pension benefits earned by 
public employees for their service in the current year. [247] For TRS and SURS 
participants, the total “normal cost” of benefits for FY 17 is about $2.5 billion. 
Employees pay their share of the total “normal cost” through pension 
contributions derived from salary deductions, which is about $1.2 billion for FY 
2017.  SURS employees contribute 8 percent of salary and TRS employees pay 9.4 
percent of salary. The remaining $1.3 billion of the total “normal cost” represents 
the employer’s portion and is currently paid by the State for downstate and 
suburban school districts, universities and community colleges.  In other words, 
even though downstate and suburban school districts, universities, and 
community colleges are the direct employers of their employees, the State pays the 
employer’s portion of the total “normal cost” of pension benefits earned by 
downstate and suburban school teachers and university and community college 
employees. 
Placed into context, the State’s annual pension contribution is comprised of the 
employer’s portion of the total “normal cost” plus an amount to pay down past 
unfunded liabilities.[248] For FY 2017, the State’s pension contribution from 
General Revenue Funds for SURS and TRS is about $5.5 billion,[249] with the 
employer’s share of the total “normal cost” consisting of about $1.3 billion of that 
total.[250] If the General Assembly were to shift the employer’s portion of the total 
“normal cost” of benefits currently paid by the State to local school districts, 
universities, and community colleges, then the State would free up about $1.3 
billion that could be spent on other priorities, such as education and public safety. 
[251] 
B.  Other Proposals 
While the Court’s recent rulings strongly signal that the State and local 
governments must inevitably come up with money needed to pay their pension 
obligations, some stakeholders view the rulings as a call to action and an 
impediment to the State’s fiscal recovery. [252] In their view, the rulings have 
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saddled the state with an “unsustainable burden” that can only be met through 
draconian tax increases and services cuts that will cause taxpayers to leave 
Illinois.[253] These stakeholders view State and local pension obligations as an 
unfair burden.  As Ty Fahner of the Chicago’s Commercial Club stated, “It is 
fundamentally unfair to ask 95 percent of us—all of us those who are not in one of 
the state’s five pension systems—to pay for the 5 percent who benefit from these 
plans.”[254] As a result, some stakeholders support amending the Pension Clause 
to permit unilateral legislative reductions in benefits, and to allow Illinois 
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy and discharge their pension 
obligations.  Both proposals are discussed below and face significant political and 
legal obstacles rendering them implausible. 
I.  Amend the Pension Clause to Permit Unilateral Legislative 
Reductions in Pension Benefits 
Shortly after the Illinois Supreme Court issued its Pension Reform decision in May 
2015, the Civic Federation of Chicago stated that now was the time to amend the 
Pension Clause to “clarify” that it only applies to “accrued benefits” so the General 
Assembly could unilaterally reduce the benefits existing employees could accrue 
through future service.[255] Calls for the amendment were renewed after the 
Illinois Supreme Court issued its Chicago Pension Reform decision.[256] 
The Civic Federation contends the amendment is necessary because the present 
level of benefits for current employees is unaffordable and jeopardizes “essential 
government services and the solvency of the pension funds.”[257] While the Civic 
Federation states that it is not supporting any specific benefit cuts, the amendment 
should be adopted so that the ideas of stakeholders who want unilateral benefits 
cuts “can be legislated.”[258] The proposed amendment was one of many 
recommendations found in the Civic Federation’s comprehensive “road map” to fix 
Illinois’ finances, which also recommended an income tax increase and expansion 
of the State’s sales tax to services.[259] 
While the Civic Federation did not unveil the text of its proposed constitutional 
amendment, there is little likelihood the amendment will become law for a couple 
reasons. The first reason relates to the process of proposing amendments to the 
Illinois Constitution. An amendment to the Illinois Constitution must first be 
proposed by the General Assembly and receive the approval of three-fifths of the 
members the Senate and House of Representatives.[260] That legislative approval 
must also occur at least six months prior to the next general election, which was 
May 9 for the November 2016 Election.  In addition, the amendment must be 
ratified by either three-fifths of those voting on the question or a majority of those 
voting in the election.[261] 
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Since no member of the General Assembly sponsored the Civic Federation’s 
proposed amendment, it was not in a position to receive legislative approval.  In 
addition, even if it had been filed, there was little prospect that the proposed 
amendment would have gained the needed supermajority support for legislative 
approval.  The 2013 Pension Reform Bill discussed earlier in this Article passed the 
General Assembly with slim majorities in both chambers and was strongly opposed 
by legislators in both political parties.[262] The Civic Federation appears to have 
accepted this reality and observed that its next opportunity to include its proposed 
constitutional amendment on ballot would be at the November 2018 
Election.[263] 
Even if the Civic Federation’s proposed amendment received legislative approval 
and was ratified by Illinois voters, it is unlikely that the proposal would survive a 
legal challenge.  As noted above, the amendment is premised on the same 
economic necessity and police power theory that the Illinois Supreme Court 
rejected in its Pension Reform decision. 
In that decision, the court rejected the State’s “police powers” argument because 
Public Act 98-0599 was not a response to an unknown or unforeseeable problem, 
but rather a response to “a crisis for which the General Assembly is largely 
responsible.”[264] The court further found that the Act was not the least restrictive 
means the State could have used to address the problem, but “an expedient to 
break a political stalemate.”[265] In addition, the court indicated that the Act was 
tantamount to a taking of private property because the Act failed to distribute the 
burdens of pension funding evenly among Illinoisans let alone the State’s contract 
partners.[266] The court explained that the U.S. Constitution “bar[s] Government 
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”[267] 
In short, whether under a Contract Clause[268] or Takings[269] theory, the same 
arguments that prevailed in the Pension Reform decision against Public Act 98-
0599 would equally apply to the Civic Federation’s proposed amendment.  As a 
result, the proposal amendment does not offer a plausible path 
to unilaterally reduce the fiscal burden of State and local pension obligations. 
 2.  Municipal Bankruptcy 
A final proposal receiving some attention is allowing municipalities to file for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a means to discharge 
all or part of the pension benefits owed to municipal employees and retirees.  The 
proposal is inspired by rulings from federal bankruptcy court judges in California 
and Detroit, which held that public pension benefits protected under California 
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and Michigan law were subject to discharge under a court-approved restructuring 
plan.[270] 
Representative Ron Sandack filed the proposal as House Bill 4214.[271]  The 
proposal would do three things as part of specifically authorizing Illinois 
municipalities to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy to discharge debt.  First, it 
establishes a neutral evaluation process whereby a mediator can evaluate the scope 
of the municipality’s financial obligations, the available means to pay those 
obligations, and assemble the municipality’s creditors to renegotiate its debts and 
thereby avoid the need to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy. [272] If the neutral 
evaluation process fails to produce a settlement within 90 days after beginning or 
an impasse is reached within that period, the municipality is free to file for Chapter 
9 bankruptcy.[273] 
Second, the proposal allows a municipality to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy without 
exhausting the neutral evaluation process if it declares a fiscal emergency as 
outlined by the proposal.[274] The proposal permits a municipality to declare a 
fiscal emergency by adopting a resolution by majority vote of its governing board 
finding that its fiscal condition “jeapordizes the health, safety, or well-being of [its] 
residents.”[275] 
Third, and most important, the proposal includes a provision establishing 
statutory lien rights for municipal general obligation and revenue 
bondholders.[276] The purpose of creating these rights is to ensure that these 
bondholders will continue to receive full and timely debt service payments during 
and after a municipal bankruptcy proceeding.[277] Generally, the filing of a 
Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition terminates the “full faith and credit” pledge a 
municipality makes to general obligation bondholders to repay them through the 
full exercise of the municipality’s taxing power.[278] The filing, in turn, enables 
the municipality to spend revenues otherwise used for debt service for other public 
purposes.  A statutory lien permits a municipality to continue making 
uninterrupted payments to bondholders during and after the bankruptcy.[279] 
In addition, the proposal seeks to classify the revenues dedicated to repay revenue 
bonds issued by Illinois municipalities as “special revenues” under Section 902 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.[280] Under certain circumstances, the Code insulates 
revenues specifically dedicated to repay revenue bonds, such as water and sewer 
user fees, from being diverted for other purposes during and after the bankruptcy 
proceeding.[281] The bond rating agency, Fitch, explained that the power of this 
protection “was evident in both the Stockton bankruptcy and the Detroit 
bankruptcy where water system bondholders were continuously paid debt 
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service.”[282] Taken together, the proposal’s creation of statutory lien rights for 
general obligation bondholders and classification of dedicated revenues to repay 
revenue bondholders as “special revenues” are intended to insulate bondholders 
from taking a “haircut” should an Illinois municipality file for bankruptcy, which 
is what occurred in the Detroit and other recent municipal bankruptcies.[283] 
Much like the Civic Federation’s proposal to amend the Pension Clause, the 
municipal bankruptcy proposal faces stiff political and legal opposition.  On 
the political front, the measure is opposed by Mayor Rahm Emanuel of Chicago 
and by public sector labor unions.[284] At an August 2015 hearing held by the 
House Pension and Personnel Committee, a bankruptcy expert observed in his 
testimony that by creating statutory lien rights the proposal was designed to 
protect municipal bondholders and allow municipalities to reject labor contracts 
and pension obligations.[285] Representative Sandack responded that municipal 
bankruptcy would only be used as a last resort, and that the main idea behind the 
proposal is to give municipalities more leverage for when they are negotiating labor 
contracts.[286] Given the current political composition of the General Assembly 
and opposition from the Mayor of Chicago, the proposal has not and is not 
expected to advance.[287] 
On the legal front, as detailed below, the proposal is untenable because the 
General Assembly simply lacks the legal power to statutorily authorize its 
municipalities to file for bankruptcy where the result is the unilateral discharge of 
their pension obligations.  This conclusion stems from the fact that before an 
Illinois municipality is eligible to file a petition under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, the General Assembly must first enact a state law providing specific 
authorization.[288] 
The state law authorization requirement derives from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in United States v. Bekins, which upheld Congress’ power to enact 
municipal bankruptcy legislation.[289] The requirement balances the 
constitutional difficulties of allowing municipalities to shed their debt obligations 
through a bankruptcy court-approved plan without running afoul of U.S. 
Constitution’s Contract Clause,[290] while also preserving the State’s sovereign 
control over its fiscal affairs and its municipalities without federal interference 
under the Tenth Amendment.[291] The Bekins decision upheld the municipal 
bankruptcy statute, in part, by emphasizing that the statute did not affect “‘any 
restriction on the powers of States or their arms of government in the exercise of 
their sovereign rights and duties.’”[292] 
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Importantly, federal courts construing the state authorization requirement have 
found that the state law purporting to provide authorization must in fact 
be valid under state law.[293] Indeed, as one federal bankruptcy court observed, 
while “Congress has made bankruptcy available to municipalities,” “states retain 
their concomitant rights to limit access by their political subdivisions to 
bankruptcy relief.”[294] 
Under our system of government, State rights and powers derive from the people 
who, in turn, can delegate it to representative instruments they create or reserve it 
to themselves.[295] The powers they have reserved are shown in the prohibitions 
set forth in State constitutions.[296] And as the Illinois Supreme Court recently 
noted, “which reserved powers a state government may exercise is a question for 
the people of that state, not the federal courts.”[297] 
This conclusion is reinforced by the Bekins decision.  In that decision, the court 
observed that States, like sovereign governments entering into treaties, are at 
liberty to make agreements “with Congress if the essence of their statehood is 
maintained without impairment.”[298] Indeed, the very legal authority[299] 
the Bekins court relied upon stated that sovereign governments were unable to 
enter into treaties that violate their own constitutions.[300] The U.S. Supreme 
Court, of course, agrees.[301] 
Given that framework, it is important to note that the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals held long ago that California’s state law authorizing its municipalities to 
file for bankruptcy did not violate the Contracts Clause of the California 
Constitution because that Clause was construed in lock-step with the Contracts 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and because the Bekins decision had found that 
the state law did not violate the federal Contracts Clause.[302] The same logic was 
employed in the Detroit bankruptcy case.  In that case, the court rejected the 
argument that the Michigan statute authorizing municipal bankruptcy violated the 
Michigan Constitution’s Pension Protection Clause because there was nothing in 
that Clause’s drafting history or jurisprudence to suggest that it was intended, as 
an independent matter of state law, to provide greater protection to pension 
benefits rights than that afforded under the U.S. Constitution’s Contracts 
Clause.[303] This is simply not the law in Illinois. 
The recent Pension Clause decisions discussed in this Article make clear that 
“when it came to retirement benefits for public employees,” the people of the 
Illinois, through the limits found in the Illinois Constitution, determined that “the 
legislature could not be trusted.”[304] To that end, the people of Illinois withdrew 
from the General Assembly the legal authority to take any action that unilaterally 
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diminishes or impairs the pension benefit rights of members of the pension 
systems.[305] 
As the Illinois Supreme Court put it, there was “no possible basis for interpreting 
the Pension Clause to mean its protections can be overridden if the General 
Assembly deems it appropriate.”[306] Indeed, according to the court, the Pension 
Clause “removed the option of unilaterally diminishing benefits as a means of 
attaining pension stability.”[307] As a result, the Pension Clause withdraws from 
the General Assembly the legal power to pass any statute authorizing municipal 
bankruptcy as a means to unilaterally discharge public pension obligations. To 
allow the General Assembly to enact such a state law would simply be an end run 
around the Pension Clause and be inconsistent with its purpose.[308] “Municipal 
governments,” after all, “are creatures of the Illinois Constitution. They have no 
other powers.”[309] 
This conclusion is made all the more necessary given the holdings of two recent 
municipal bankruptcy court decisions.[310] In both cases, the bankruptcy court 
judges found that once a state legally authorizes a municipality to file for Chapter 
9 bankruptcy, the municipality is free to discharge its pension obligations through 
a bankruptcy court-approved plan regardless of any state law obstacles to the 
contrary.[311] Whether these decisions would equally apply to an Illinois 
municipality in light of the Pension Clause is beyond the scope of this Article, but 
it appears highly uncertain in this author’s view based on the Bekins decision and 
Chapter 9’s plain language and legislative history.[312] 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Bismarck once said, “Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable.”  Through its 
recent Pension Reform and Chicago Pension Reform decisions, the Illinois 
Supreme Court delivered a clear message that the politics of pension reform 
requires fidelity to the Illinois Constitution, making unilateral reductions in 
benefits both impossible and unattainable.  Politics without such fidelity is 
ineffectual and comes at tremendous public expense.  We are, after all, a 
government of laws, not men and women. 
As detailed in this Article, the Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decisions reveal a 
viable path to enact pension reform legislation that results in savings to the State 
and squares with the Illinois Constitution’s Pension Clause.  That path is 
adherence to usual contract principles and Senate President John Cullerton’s 
proposal provides one approach consistent with those principles.  Another more 
collaborative approach is engaging public sector labor unions and forging an 
40  ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT WINTER/SPRING  2016 
 
agreement that reduces pension benefits of current union employees through the 
collective bargaining process. 
Lawmakers may also restructure the current statutory funding schedule and 
pursue some form of a buyout proposal. In addition, lawmakers may shift the 
employer’s portion of the “normal cost” of pension benefits paid by the State for 
downstate and suburban teachers and university and community college 
employees, respectively, to local school districts, universities, and community 
colleges. Finally, while amending the Pension Clause to permit unilateral benefit 
cuts and allowing Illinois municipalities to file for Chapter 9 bankruptcy to 
discharge their pension obligations are portrayed by its supporters as viable 
options, this Article shows that is simply not the case. 
In the end, while contract principles and other permissible options discussed in 
this Article can help mitigate the financial burden of State and municipal pension 
obligations, the State must still restructure its revenue system so it fiscal 
obligations are met, not simply deferred. That, of course, will require political 
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disturb that arrangement, that is, it does not give a city rights and powers independent of the 
state.  Thus, chapter 9 does not give a city the power to file a bankruptcy petition.  Rather, it is 
the state which must decide whether to empower its cities to file.”); In re City of Harrisburg, 
PA, 465 B.R. 744, 753-54 (Bankr. M.D.Pa., 2011) (same). 
[290] Id. at 53-54 (discussing that the purpose of the municipal bankruptcy statute was simply 
to remove the obstacle posed by the U.S. Constitution’s Contract Clause to state legislation 
impairing existing contracts because only Congress had the power to remove the obstacle via its 
bankruptcy power); Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902) (“The grant to 
Congress [regarding bankruptcies] involves the power to impair the obligation of contracts, and 
this the states were forbidden to do.”). 
[291] 304 U.S. at 51-53 (explaining how the statute preserved state control over its fiscal affairs 
and its because the municipality had to have state law authority to carry out the plan approved 
by the bankruptcy court, and because the states, like sovereign governments entering into 
treaties, were at liberty to make agreements “with Congress if the essence of their statehood is 
maintained without impairment.”). 
[292] Id. at 49-53 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 75-517, at 2 (1937); S.Rep. No. 75911, at 2 (1937)) 
(emphasis added). Seven years after its Bekins decision, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized 
that it upheld the municipal bankruptcy statute “only because Congress had been ‘especially 
solicitous to afford no ground’ for the ‘objection’ that an exercise of federal bankruptcy over 
political subdivisions of the State ‘might materially restrict (its) control over its fiscal affairs’ 
whereby states would no longer be ‘free to manage their own affairs’. The statute was ‘carefully 
drawn so as not to impinge on the sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal 
affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised * * * only in a case where the action of the taxing 
agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved by the bankruptcy court is authorized by 
state law.’” Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 312 U.S. 502, 508 (1942) 
(quoting Bekins, 304 U.S. at 50-51). 
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[293] See In re Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 462 B.R. 397, 417-421 (Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 2011) (finding that a public benefit corporation established under New York law was 
ineligible to file a Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition because the New York county that authorized 
the filing through a county resolution lacked the state constitutional authority to enact such a 
resolution, and noting that court could not turn “a blind eye to New York law governing the scope 
of a county’s authority”); In re New York City Off-Track Betting Corp., 427 B.R. 256, 268-71 
(Bankr. S.D. N.Y 2010) (stating that “courts must look to state law” when determining whether 
valid authorization is given to a municipality to file a Chapter 9 provision and looking to relevant 
provisions of the state constitution); In re Sullivan County Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 
60, 73 and n. 41 (Bankr. D.N.H.1994) (same, and stating a “municipality has only those powers 
granted by the state. Unless state law has authorized the municipality to seek protection under 
federal law, use of the Bankruptcy Code would implicate the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.”); In re Summer Lake Irr. Dist., 33 F. Supp. 504, 506 (D. Or. 1940) (“The question 
of the technical validity of state consent is a question of state law for the determination of state 
courts.”). See also, Brief for the U.S. as Intervenor-Appellee, In re: City of Detroit,2014 WL 
2555744 at *39-*40 (6th Cir. 2014) (stating that a “state law that purports to authorize 
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings but that is invalid under the State’s own constitution 
would not satisfy this statutory requirement” and that “the question of whether the Michigan 
Pension Clause does in fact render invalid the state law authorizing commencement of these 
proceedings turns solely on issues of state law.”); Vincent S.J. Buccola, Who Does Bankruptcy? 
Mapping Pension Impairment in Chapter 9, 33 Rev. Banking & Fin. L. 585, 606-07 (observing 
that “if within the meaning of a state’s constitution the act of [a municipality] petitioning [under 
Chapter 9]—or perhaps the act of petitioning plus proposing to adjust debts—were understood 
to constitute ‘impairment,’ then statutory authorization to petition would be void as ultra 
vires.”). McConnell & Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to Municipal 
Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 457 & n. 143 (1993) (“Looming in the background of this 
issue [i.e., the state law authorization requirement], but not resolved in litigation, is whether 
general state constitutional provisions requiring municipalities to make adequate provision for 
the payment of debts should be interpreted as barring bankruptcy filings.”) (cited favorably 
in Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Trust, Nos. 15-233, 15-255, — S.Ct. —, 2016 WL 
3221517, at *8 (U.S., June 13, 2016)). 
[294] In re City of Harrisburg, Pa., 465 B.R. 744, 753 (Bankr.M.D.Pa. 2011). Moreover, it is 
beyond doubt that “municipalities are political subdivisions of states from which they derive all 
of their rights and powers. Chapter 9 does not disturb that arrangement, that is, it does not give 
a city rights and powers independent of the state.” In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688, 692 
(1991). Under Illinois law, “[m]unicipal governments, whether home rule or nonhome-rule, are 
creatures of the Illinois Constitution.” AT&T v. Village of Arlington Heights, 156 Ill.2d 399, 414, 
620 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (1993). 
[295] City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 672, (1976); McPherson v. 
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) (“legislative power is the supreme authority, except as limited by 
the constitution of the state, and the sovereignty of the people is exercised through their 
representatives in the legislature, unless by the fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed…. 
What is forbidden or required to be done by a state is forbidden or required of the legislative 
power under state constitutions as they exist”). 
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[296] Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876). 
[297] In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, at n. 14, 32 N.E.3d 1, n. 14. 
Accord Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (“Through the structure of its government, 
and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a 
sovereign.”); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608, 612 (1937) (“How power shall be 
distributed by a state among its governmental organs is commonly, if not always, a question for 
the state itself.”); Schuettee v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1646-47 
(2014) (Scalia, J. concurring) (“So it would seem to go without saying that a State may give 
certain powers to cities, later assign the same powers to counties, and even reclaim them for 
itself.”). 
[298] Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53. 
[299] Id. at 52 (citing 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 493, 494 (4th ed.; 2 HYDE, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 489). 
[300] See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 497 (4th ed.) (“Such treaties concluded by heads 
of States, or representatives authorised [sic] by these heads, as violate constitutional restrictions 
are not real treaties, and do not bind the State concerned, because the representatives have 
exceeded their powers in concluding the treaties.”); 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 494 (“An 
independent State is deemed to possess the broadest right to enter into international 
agreements.  Its constitution may, however, in various ways limit and regulate the exercise of the 
right, restricting the conclusion of treaties designed to effect certain objects, or prescribing the 
method by which the State shall give its consent to certain classes of engagements.  An 
unconstitutional treaty must be regarded as void.”). 
[301] See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1957) (finding that Congress cannot legally bind itself 
to a treaty with another nation that violates the Bill of Rights). 
[302] In re Merced Irr. Dist., 114 F.2d 654, 665 (9th Cir. 1940). See United Firefighters of Los 
Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 259 Cal.Rptr. 65, 68-75 (Cal. App.1989) (noting that public 
pension benefits are protected under both the State and Federal Contracts Clauses); Birkhofer 
v. Krumm, 81 P.2d 609, 620-21 (Cal. App. 1938) (construing the California Contract Clause in 
lockstep with the federal Contract Clause). As a question of federal law, the U.S. Supreme Court 
is the ultimate expositor of whether a state law violates the U.S. Constitution. Dodge v. Bd. of 
Educ. of City of Chicago., 302 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1937). When it comes to whether a state law 
violates the Illinois Constitution, however, the Illinois Supreme Court, not a federal court has 
the last word. Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, at ¶79, 991 N.E.2d 745, 
765. 
[303] In re City of Detroit, Mich., 504 B.R. 191, 244-48 (Bankr. E.D.Mich. 2013). 
[304] In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, at ¶82, 32 N.E.3d at 26-27. 
[305] Id. at ¶¶82-87, 32 N.E.3d at 26-28. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892) 
(observing that the “legislative power is the supreme authority, except as limited by the 
constitution of the state, and the sovereignty of the people is exercised through their 
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representatives in the legislature, unless by the fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed. * 
* * What is forbidden or required to be done by a state is forbidden or required of the legislative 
power under state constitutions as they exist.”).  Cf. IBM v. Evans, 99 S.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ga. 
1957) (holding that the Georgia legislature could not exempt property from state taxation in 
violation of the state constitution when providing consent to exclusive federal jurisdiction over 
that property under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the U.S. Constitution). 
[306] Jones, 2016 IL 119618, at ¶32 (quoting In re Pension Reform Litigation, 2015 IL 118585, 
at ¶75). 
[307] Id. at ¶47. 
[308] Id. 
[309] AT&T v. Village of Arlington Heights, 156 Ill.2d 399, 414, 620 N.E.2d 1040, 1047 (1993). 
[310] In re City of Stockton, Cal., 526 B.R. 35, 56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015); In re City of Detroit, 
Mich., 504 B.R. 191, 254-55 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re City of Stockton, Cal., 475 B.R. 720, 
727-2 9 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012) 
[311] In re City of Stockton, Cal., 526 B.R. 35, 56 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2015); In re City of Detroit, 
Mich., 504 B.R. 191, 254-55 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2013); In re City of Stockton, Cal., 475 B.R. 720, 
727-29 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2012). 
[312] See Hon. Thomas B. Bennett, Consent: Its Scope, Blips, Blemishes, and a Bekins 
Extrapolation Too Far, 37 CAMPBELL L. REV. 3, 17-18, 22-23 (2015) (for a well-reasoned criticism 
of the current view taken by some bankruptcy court judges that once a state authorizes its 
municipalities to file a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case neither the state, the municipality, nor anyone 
else may reject the use of any parts of Chapter 9 along the road to readjustment of municipal 
debts). 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By, Student Editorial Board: 
Marko Cvijanovic, Jenna Kim, Zachary Jordan, and Mary M. Pietrzak 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations 
Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public 
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the 
public employee collective bargaining statutes, the equal employment opportunity 
laws and the pension provision of the Illinois Constitution. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.   Strikes 
In Chicago Board of Education and Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, IFT-
AFT, 32 PERI ¶ 194 (IELRB 2016), the IELRB granted the Chicago Board of 
Education’s (CBE) request for preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to Section 
16(d) of the IELRA.  The IELRB found reasonable cause to believe that the Chicago 
Teachers Union (CTU) authorized and conducted a one-day strike which may have 
violated of Sections 14(b)(3) and 13(b) of the IELRA when the Union had not given 
10 days’ notice of its intent to strike and had not exhausted statutory impasse 
procedures.  The IELRB also held that preliminary injunctive relief was just and 
proper under the circumstances. 
The CTU and the CBE’s most recent collective bargaining agreement expired on 
June 30, 2015.  On April 1, 2016, the union engaged in a one-day strike to protest 
an alleged unfair labor practice for the CBE’s refusal to bargain in good faith and 
to protest the State of Illinois’s failure to fund public education in Chicago 
adequately. 
Under Section 13(b) of the IELRA, for a strike against CPS to be lawful, a minimum 
of 30 days must elapse after a fact-finding report has been made public and a 
minimum of 10 days must elapse after a notice of intent to strike is given by the 
union to the employer.  At the time of the strike, neither condition was satisfied 
and the IELRB concluded that the April 1, 2016 strike did not meet the Section 
13(b) requirements. 
Section 14(b)(3) of the IELRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to fail 
to bargain in good faith. The IELRB cited its prior decisions recognizing that 
engaging in an unlawful strike violates Section 14(b)(3). The IELRB rejected the 
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CTU’s argument that, in accordance with Maestro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 
U.S. 270 (1956), strikes over unfair labor practices are not subject to statutory 
notice requirements.  The IELRB reasoned that the private sector precedent did 
not apply under the IELRA which has carefully crafted pre-requisites for a strike 
to be lawful and which abrogated the common law rule that all public employee 
strikes are illegal. The IELRB observed that statutes in derogation of the common 
law are construed strictly in accordance with their express language. 
The CTU also argued that its trike was lawful because it was aimed at the legislature 
and not at the CBE’s bargaining position. The IELRB rejected that argument, 
observing that accepting the CTU’s position “would completely eviscerate the very 
carefully constructed statutory scheme for when strikes can be 
lawful.”  Accordingly, the IELRB concluded that there was reasonable cause to 
believe the Union’s April 1, 2016 strike violated Section 14(b)(3) of the Act. 
This was the first time the IELRB has faced a situation where (1) a union claimed 
the right to strike without regard to the requirements of the IELRA and where (2) 
a union voluntarily placed a one day limit on a strike. The IELRB found that 
preliminary injunctive relief was just and proper due to the probability that the 
CTU could engage in another strike prior to satisfying the Section 13(b) 
requirements. The IELRB reasoned that the conditions which motivated the April 
1, 2016 strike still existed and the CTU had not acknowledged that its conduct had 
been unlawful. 
The IELRB acknowledged that CTU President Karen Lewis wrote a letter to CBE 
Director of Labor Relations Joseph Moriarity assuring that the CTU would not 
engage in another strike without exhausting the statutory impasse procedures and 
providing the statutorily-required notice. The IELRB, nevertheless, found 
injunctive relief just and proper because Ms. Lewis did not have authority to bind 
the CTU, only the CTU’s House of Delegates and its membership had such 
authority; the CTU continued to maintain that its strike was lawful; and the matter 
was one of substantial public interest. 
IELRB Member Syred dissented. She argued that injunctive relief was not 
appropriate because the law governing whether the Section 13(b) requirements 
applied to unfair labor practice strikes was unsettled and the likelihood of a 
reoccurrence of the April 1 strike was speculative. 
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II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Arbitration 
In State of Illinois v. AFSCME, 2016 IL 118422 (2016), the Illinois Supreme Court 
vacated an arbitrator’s award enforcing a bargained-for wage increase.  The court 
held that because the General Assembly had not appropriated funds, as required 
by Section 21 of the IPLRA, to pay for the wage increases, the award ordering the 
State to pay the increases was against public policy.  The court emphasized that its 
holding only applied to the enforcement of multi-year collective bargaining 
agreements with State employees, which, according to the IPLRA, are negotiable 
“subject to the appropriation power of the employer.”  The court did find that, as a 
matter of law, the arbitrator’s award enforcing the wage increases “drew its 
essence” from the contract but rejected AFSCME’s argument that allowing wage 
increases to be subject to appropriations rendered bargaining for wage increases 
meaningless; the State convinced the court that enforcing the award would violate 
a clear public policy that the State may not spend public money without legislative 
authorization to do so. 
In 2008, AFSCME and the State negotiated a multi-year collective bargaining 
agreement covering more than 40,000 State employees.  The agreement was set to 
expire on June 30, 2012, and included wage increases in each year.  As time went 
on, the State of Illinois’ financial situation declined considerably.  AFSCME agreed 
to changes which afforded the State hundreds of millions of dollars in cost savings, 
including delaying part of the wage increases scheduled for the 2012 fiscal 
year.  The Governor’s proposed budget for that year would have covered the 
delayed wage increases, but the General Assembly’s approved budget left 14 State 
agencies without enough funds to pay the increases.  AFSCME took this to 
arbitration, arguing that the State was nevertheless obligated to pay the bargained-
for increases.  Basing his decision on the four corners of the collective bargaining 
agreement and declining, on lack of jurisdiction grounds, to consider the State’s 
arguments based on Section 21 of the IPLRA, the arbitrator ordered the State to 
pay the wage increases.  The State appealed to the Illinois courts.  At issue in the 
lower courts was the effect of Section 21, which makes collective bargaining for 
multi-year agreements “subject to the appropriation power.”  The Appellate Court 
upheld the arbitrator’s award and reiterated the State’s obligation to pay the wage 
increase, saying that the unavailability of the funds  at a particular time does not 
erase the bargaining obligation and the State should pay the increases as it could 
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and vacated the award as against public 
policy.  The court rejected AFSCME’s arguments that (1) making wage increases 
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subject to appropriations renders bargaining over wage increases meaningless, 
and (2) since other contracts have expressly made wage increases subject to 
appropriations and this contract did not, the exclusion of such a provision means 
the raises were not subject to appropriation.  Instead the court found that Section 
21 of the IPLRA implies that all multi-year collective bargaining agreements are 
subject to appropriations by the General Assembly.  A partial dissent took issue 
with this line of reasoning, saying that allowing the State to get out of its bargaining 
obligations by failing to appropriate funds is itself a public policy 
violation.  However, the majority limited its holding, consistent with Section 21 of 
the IPLRA, to say that only multi-year agreements are subject to appropriations by 
the General Assembly. 
B.  Supervisors 
In Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of, Engineering, Local 1092 v. City of Chicago, 
Department of Water Management, Case No. L-RC-15-009 (ILRB Local Panel 
2016), the Local Panel affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s decision, finding 
that the Chief Dispatcher employed by the City of Chicago, Department of Water 
Management was not a supervisor within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the IPLRA. 
Central Dispatch processed all calls and complaints regarding the City of Chicago’s 
water and sewer system. Chief Dispatcher Joe Pusateri oversaw all operations and 
employees of the Central Dispatch. 
Under Section 3(r) of the Act, employees are supervisors when they: (1) perform 
principal work that is substantially different from the work of their subordinates; 
(2) have the authority, in the interest of the employer, to perform any enumerated 
supervisory functions or effectively recommend such action; (3) use independent 
judgment consistently when performing those functions; and (4) spend a 
preponderance of their time exercising that authority. 
When faced with an errant employee, Pusateri was able to either discuss matters 
with the employee or request a pre-disciplinary hearing. At a pre-disciplinary 
hearing, the hearing officer determined if the employee would be subject to 
discipline. In finding that Pusateri was not a supervisor under Section 3(r), the ALJ 
noted that Pusateri could not actually initiate discipline against his subordinates. 
Rather, Pusateri was only able to recommend discipline by requesting a pre-
disciplinary hearing. The ALJ found that the ability to recommend discipline was 
not the same as being able to effectively recommend disciplinary action. Because 
the record lacked evidence of how frequently Pusateri’s recommendations were 
followed, the ALJ concluded that the City failed to prove that Pusateri had the 
power to effectively recommend discipline. The ILRB affirmed the ALJ’s decision. 
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Board Member Anderson dissented. He argued that Pusateri did have the authority 
to effectively recommend discipline. Board Member Anderson noted that Pusateri 
implicitly had the authority to effectively recommend discipline because he had the 
authority to choose between selecting a non-disciplinary approach, discussing 
matters with the employee, or initiating a formal disciplinary process. 
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS 
A.  Constructive Discharge 
In Green v. Brennan, 136 S. Ct. 1769 (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
statute of limitations for a constructive discharge claim begins to run only when 
the employee gives notice of his resignation, not on the last date of the employer’s 
allegedly discriminatory act. 
Marvin Green worked for the U.S. Postal Service for 35 years. In 2008, he applied 
for a promotion but was passed over. Green alleged that he was denied the 
promotion because of his race. In 2009, Green’s supervisors accused him of 
intentionally delaying the mail, which is a criminal offense. On December 16, 2009, 
Green and the Postal Service signed an agreement (the “Agreement”). The 
Agreement promised that the Postal Service would not pursue criminal charges in 
exchange for Green’s promise to leave his current postmaster position. The 
Agreement also gave Green the choice to retire or accept a different position at a 
location with significantly lower pay. Green chose to retire. On February 9, 2010, 
Green submitted his resignation effective March 31, 2010. 
On March 22, 2010 – 41 days after submitting his Resignation, but 96 days after 
signing the Agreement, Green initiated counseling with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity (EEO) office to report an unlawful constructive discharge in violation 
of Title VII. Unlike a private sector employee, who generally has 180 or 300 days 
to file a charge of discrimination, before a federal civil servant can sue his 
employer, he must contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of the “matter alleged 
to be discriminatory.” 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 
Green filed suit in federal court. However, both the district court and U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed that Green’s claim against the Postal Service 
was time-barred and dismissed his claim.  Both courts agreed that the limitations 
period for Green’s constructive discharge claim began to run on the date of the last 
alleged discriminatory act by the Postal Service, which was the signing of the 
Agreement on December 16, 2009. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the 45-day period for 
initiating counseling begins to run on the date an employee resigns, not on the date 
of the employer’s last allegedly discriminatory act giving rise to the resignation. 
The court relied on the “standard rule” canon, where a limitations period starts to 
run only when a plaintiff has “a complete and present cause of action” upon which 
he can file suit and obtain relief. The Court noted that a complete and present cause 
of action for a constructive discharge claim has two elements: 
(1) discrimination that becomes so intolerable that a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position would have felt compelled to resign; and (2) actual resignation. 
The Court determined that a complete and present cause of action for a 
constructive discharge claim necessarily includes the employee’s resignation. In 
support of the decision, the Court noted that practical considerations support 
applying the “standard rule” because “[s]tarting the limitations clock ticking before 
a plaintiff can actually sue for constructive discharge serves little purpose in 
furthering the goals of a limitations period.” 
Green and the Postal Service, however, disagreed on the actual date of resignation. 
Green argued that he resigned when he submitted his retirement paperwork on 
February 9, 2010.  The Postal Service argued that Green resigned on December 16, 
2009, when he signed the Agreement. The Court remanded the case to the Tenth 
Circuit to determine the date on which Green gave notice that he would resign. 
B.  Pension Developments 
In Jones v. Municipal Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2016 IL 119618, the 
Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court of Cook County’s decision that 
Public Act 98-641’s reduction of retirement annuities to members of the Municipal 
Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund and the Laborers’ and Retirement Board 
Employees’ Annuity and Benefit Fund (collectively the Funds)  violated Article 
XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution. 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution is commonly known as the 
Pension Protection Clause.  It states, “Membership in any pension or retirement 
system of the State, any unit of local government or school district, or agency or 
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the 
benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.”  Public Act 98-641 reduced 
the value of annual annuity increases, eliminated them entirely for certain years, 
postponed the time at which they began, and completely eliminated the 
compounding component of the increases. It also increased employee 
contributions and provided for gradual increases in City contributions until the 
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funds achieved 90 percent funding in 2055. It also contained provisions for 
enforcement of the City’s funding obligations. 
Defendants argued that the Act provided an offsetting benefit to its members 
because it would rescue the funds from becoming insolvent. However, the court 
reasoned that passing a statute that looked to changing funding methods to ensure 
the Funds would reach 90 percent funding by 2055 did not create a “benefit” 
protected by the Pension Protection Clause. The court rejected the City’s assertion 
that the funding provisions in the Act must be viewed as a “benefit” because they 
replaced a number of illusory promises. The court broke down the City’s 
contention by reasoning that promising solvency cannot be netted against the 
“unconstitutional diminishment of benefits.” The court concluded that the General 
Assembly could not unilaterally implement new terms of the Act. 
The City contended that the Act was a bargained-for exchange with its unions and 
not a unilaterally-produced change. The court found that the unions were not 
acting as authorized agents within a collective bargaining process, and the 
negotiations were no different than legislative advocacy on behalf of an interest 
group. The court affirmed the circuit court’s decision that the Act was 




In Matthews v. Chicago Transit Authority 2016 IL 117638, the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that current employees lacked standing to challenge the enforceability 
of the Chicago Transit Authority’s (CTA) 2007 collective bargaining agreement 
(CBA) which changed retiree health insurance, but employees who had retired 
prior to the 2007 CBA  had standing to challenge its enforceability. Furthermore, 
the court held that the provision of health care benefits to the retirees who retired 
under the 2004 CBA constituted an enforceable, vested right that survived the 
expiration of that agreement. 
Under prior CBAs, including the 2004 CBA which ran through December 31, 2006, 
retirees received health insurance at no cost to them.  The contracts further 
provided, “This benefit terminates when the retiree attains age 65.”   The 2004 
CBA also provided, “Either of the parties hereto shall have the right to open this 
Agreement for modification and/or additions to be effective January 1, 2007 . . 
.”  The parties were unable to reach agreement on the terms of the 2007 CBA and 
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they submitted their dispute to interest arbitration. The arbitrator awarded that a 
trust would be created which would become solely responsible for retiree health 
care, that the trust would be empowered to charge retirees up to 45 percent of their 
health care costs and to assess a 3 percent payroll tax on current employees to fund 
the trust. The General Assembly enacted legislation implementing the arbitration 
award and the trust. 
The current and retired former employees brought putative class actions against 
the CTA and its retirement plan following the changes to health care benefits. The 
five individual plaintiffs were named on behalf of themselves and as 
representatives of two putative classes. In Class I, Williams represented former 
employees who were members of Amalgamated Transit Union Local 308 and 
retired under the 2004 CBA. In Class II, the remaining plaintiffs represented a 
class of CTA employees and retirees who retired after January 1, 2007, or remained 
current employees of the CTA. 
The court held that the current employees and those who retired after January 1, 
2007, lacked standing to sue. The court noted that only the parties to a CBA may 
dispute an arbitration award in court; therefore, only the employer and the 
designated representative of the bargaining unit may bring suit to challenge an 
arbitration award. In this case, the CBA provided that the CTA recognized the 
transit union as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent for the 
bargaining unit employees. The individual members of a bargaining unit may not 
bring suit against an employer to challenge an arbitration award unless the court 
finds that the union breached its duty of fair representation. In this case, the Class 
II plaintiffs were represented by the Transit Unions during the bargaining and 
arbitration process that resulted in the 2007 CBA. Additionally, there was no 
allegation that the union breached its duty of fairly representing the Class II 
plaintiffs. Therefore, those plaintiffs lacked standing. 
In contrast, following expiration of the 2004 CBA, Williams and the Class I retirees 
were no longer employed by the CTA and were not represented in the subsequent 
collective bargaining and arbitration proceedings. Therefore, the court held, they 
had standing to pursue claims for enforcement of benefits granted under the 2004 
CBA. 
The court distinguished the case before it from its prior cases involving changes to 
retirement benefits. In prior cases, the benefits were set by statute and the changes 
were made by amending the relevant statute.  In the instant case, the benefits were 
created by collective bargaining agreements and were subject to the terms of the 
CBAs.  The court reasoned that the Pension Protection Clause of the Illinois 
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Constitution protects the retirement benefits as provided for in the CBA but does 
not preclude modification of those benefits if modification is allowed under the 
CBA. The court wrote: 
For those public servants whose employment is governed by a contract, such as a CBA, 
the pension protection clause guarantees the retirement benefits that are provided in their 
employment contract. The terms of such an agreement are subject to negotiation between 
the public employer and the designated collective bargaining representative and are 
implemented by the applicable provisions codifying the agreement in the Pension Code. 
If the terms of the agreement provide for vested retirement benefits, those benefits are 
constitutionally protected by [the Pension Protection Clause]. However. . . if the 
underlying contract allows for the modification of certain retirement benefits, the pension 
protection clause does not preclude modification or alter the essential nature of the rights 
granted under the contract. Therefore, neither the language of the pension protection 
clause nor our prior case law presents an obstacle to a contractual provision that permits 
subsequent modification of public retirement benefits. 
The court then turned to the terms of the 2004 CBA. Focusing on the provision 
that the retiree health benefit terminated when the retiree turned age 65, the court 
concluded that the 2004 CBA reflected the intent to provide health care benefits to 
former employees during their retirement and to specify the type of benefit that 
would be provided based on the age of each retiree. Thus, although retiree health 
care benefits could be changed by agreement upon expiration of the 2004 CBA, 
Williams’ and other retirees’ contractual right to retiree health care benefits under 
the 2004 CBA was fully accrued and not modified by agreement or the 2007 
arbitration. Therefore, the Court held that the provision of health care benefits to 
Williams and the other Class I plaintiffs who retired under the 2004 CBA 
constituted an enforceable, vested right that survived the expiration of that 
agreement. The court held that they stated a claim for breach of the Pension 
Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution. 
  
 
